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ABSTRACT
Collaborative Caching for Efficient and Robust Certificate
Authority Services in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks
Laith A. Al-Sulaiman
Old Dominion University, 2005
Director: Dr. Hussein Abdel-Wahab

Security in Mobile Ad-Hoc Network (MANET) is getting a lot o f attention due to its
inherent vulnerability to a wide spectrum o f attacks. Threats exist in every layer o f
MANET stack, and different solutions have been adapted for each security problem.
Additionally, availability is an important criterion in most MANET solutions, but many
security frameworks did not consider it. Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) is no exception,
and its deployment in MANET needs major design and implementation modifications
that can fit constraints unique to this environment. Our focus in this dissertation is to
adapt and increase the availability of Certificate Authority (CA) services, as a major PKI
entity, in MANET.
Several attempts have been proposed to deal with the problem o f deploying CA in
MANET to provide a generic public-key framework, but each either ends up sacrificing
system security or availability. Here, the main goal of our work is to provide a solution
that addresses performance and security issues of providing MANET-based PKI.
Particularly, we would like to maintain the availability o f the services provided by CA
while keeping the network's packet overhead as low as possible.
In this dissertation, we present a MANET-based framework suitable for
exchanging public-key certificates by collaborative caching between MANET clients. We
show that our system can meet the challenges o f providing robust and secure CA services
in MANET. Augmented by simulation results, we demonstrate quantitatively the
feasibility of our work as we were able to reduce network overhead associated with
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threshold based CA queries up to 92% as compared to related work in addition to having
a very short response time. The dependency on CA servers has been reduced, and the
system was able to tolerate as much as two-third inoperative CA servers without
noticeable decrease in the service performance.
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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
Mobile Ad-Hoc Network (MANET) applications and services pose many interesting
challenges due to the unique features of MANET environment. More specifically,
MANET security is getting a lot o f attention due to its inherent vulnerability to attacks.
Threats exist in every layer of MANET stack, and different solutions have been adapted
for each security problem. Another problem for MANET is availability, but adding more
resources will not necessarily make the system more available. One important problem is
how to provide a security framework that could be utilized in different MANET protocols
and applications. One way of providing a generic, security-based framework is to deploy
Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI). However, PKI deployment in MANET needs to be
designed and tailored carefully to comply with MANET. More specifically, the focus of
our discussion is how to adapt the Certificate Authority (CA), which is a major PKI
entity, in MANET.
Several attempts have been made to tackle the problem o f providing a generic
public-key framework, but each either ends up sacrificing system security or availability.
Here, the main goal o f our work is to provide a solution that addresses performance and
security issues of providing MANET-based PKI. Particularly, we would like to increase
the availability of the services provided by CA component while lowering the packet
overhead of the network without increasing network vulnerability.
In this dissertation, we present a framework suitable for exchanging public-key
certificates in MANET based on collaborative caching between network clients. We will
show that our system can meet the challenges o f providing robust and secure CA services
in such harsh environment. Supported by simulation results, we will also demonstrate
quantitatively the feasibility of our work as compared to other related research which has

The journal model for this dissertation is the IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

2

addressed the same problem. In this thesis, the terms framework, system, service, and
protocol are used interchangeably. The term "Principal" will be used to refer to an entity
involved in cryptographically protected communication (e.g. human or machine).
This section is organized as follows: Section 1.1 is a general overview o f our
work. Section 1.2 presents the motivation and objectives for our work while Section 1.3
is a summary of our results and contributions. Finally, Section 1.4 is the outline o f this
dissertation.

1.1.

Overview

MANET is raising many interesting challenges for applications and services due to its
unique characteristics. Not relying on fixed infrastructure combined with tight
constraints, such as power consumption, transmission range, and possibly computational
capabilities, are just a few examples o f such challenges.
Security, on the other hand, is as crucial as other challenges and has received
much attention from researchers in every aspect o f MANET due to its inherent
vulnerability to wider security attacks compared to wired networks. Assuming that nodes
will be safe from physical attacks is no longer a realistic assumption, not to mention other
diverse threats such as spectrum jamming, disruption o f routing messages, denial of
service, and eavesdropping (e.g.[41], [73], [57], [28]).
Availability is another significant problem, and as an important dimension of
Quality of Service (QoS), has been addressed in MANET from a variety o f perspectives
(e.g. [14], [27], [45]). Unfortunately, availability cannot be guaranteed by just adding
more resources without careful planning. Naively adding more resources may have
adverse effect like increasing the overhead of the system or exposing its security.
MANET requires solutions that consider its unique characteristics. Thus,
solutions designed for wired networks cannot be ported transparently because, simply,
many of them have been proposed under the assumption o f good connectivity and no
mobility, which means a low link failure between nodes.
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Another problem in MANET is adapting security frameworks to protect various
components o f MANET stack. Various public-key based solutions such as [5], [30] seem
to be good candidates, but they are too expensive to be practically deployed unless we
redesign them using a MANET-centric approach. A typical PKI system consists of
certificates, a CA, a revocation mechanism, and a mechanism to evaluate a chain of
certificates to the target [41]. Public/private-keys can be used for encrypting and/or
signing in many vital modules and applications, such as authentication, secure exchange
of routing information, encrypting or signing emails, and much more. A CA is usually
used to organize, store, and issue certificates that associate a public-key to an identity.
As we can see, PKI has been used and implemented in wired networks and, in
principle, could be used to provide security for MANET as well. However, implementing
PKI in MANET is not an easy task since current PKI solutions are conceptually designed
for centralized, wired, and well-connected networks. The unique features o f MANET
makes the task o f providing a reliable and secure service much more difficult.
A direct solution like installing a single CA server per MANET will make it very
vulnerable and, in fact, will create a single point o f failure. Moreover, replication of the
CA could increase robustness but would make the situation even worse, compared to the
single CA solution, by exposing the system and giving the attacker more choices.
Recently, researchers have tried to solve the dilemma o f security and availability
and provided some solutions to adapt CA services to MANET. These solutions rely on
secret sharing concepts and mechanisms (e.g. [25], [39], [66], [26]) to increase system
security and availability. Conceptually, secret sharing is a mechanism o f distributing a
secret (e.g. key) between multiple, say n , parties in a way such that any t (also called
"threshold" where 1 < t < n ) parties can reveal the secret. This means that if less than t
parties have been compromised, the secret is still safe. When t = 1, it means the system is
more available since any one out of n could be contacted, and when t = n , it means the
system is highly secure since an attacker needs to compromise all the nodes to gain the
secret. However, the system may lose its robustness since compromising a single node
will put the system out of service. Thus, t is the balance point between availability and
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security. On the bright side, secret sharing could be a natural fit for MANET; however, it
cannot be deployed without consequences, as we will see later in this dissertation.
The first attempt to adapt CA service based on secret sharing techniques to
MANET was by Hass and Zhou [73]. They sketched an elegant solution based on Cornell
Online Certificate Authority (COCA) as a foundation for a pervasive CA service in
MANET. The novelty was to use threshold cryptography to securely distribute the
private-key of the service over multiple servers. Each server has part of the CA service
private-key, and it must collaborate with at least t —1 other servers to provide security
services such as signing and/or updating certificates. When a client wants to use the
service it will contact a predetermined CA server called the "delegate." The delegate will
contact t —1 CAs passing the request to them and wait for their partial signature for the
certificate in question. After collecting the replies, the delegate will reconstruct the
certificate and send it back to the client.
Inspired by COCA, Mobile CA (MOCA) [70] has been introduced as a candidate
for providing CA services in MANET but with more consideration to its unique
properties since COCA was originally designed for wired networks and did not consider
client connectivity. MOCA consists o f mobile nodes within a MANET selected to
provide distributed CA functionality. MOCA nodes apply threshold cryptography to
share the responsibility and increase the availability of the service. Client nodes need to
contact sufficient MOCAs to get the service. When a client wishes to get a certificate, it
sends request packets to at least t MOCA servers and waits for a reply. Any MOCA that
receives a request will answer by sending a reply that contains its partial signature for the
subject in question. The client needs to receive at least t valid replies and combine them
to reconstruct the whole certificate. Usually, MOCA clients will send more than t unicast
requests to increase protocol robustness.
Another proposal, Ubiquitous and Robust Security Architecture (URSA), was
suggested by Kong et al. [43], and their goal was to provide pervasive CA services by
making all n nodes in the network share CA functionality. However, since sharing the
private-key by all participants is obviously unfeasible, especially in MANET, Kong’s
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scheme was to distribute the service private-key into every coalition o f nodes, where each
coalition has at least t nodes, and they are one hop apart such that a client needs only to
contact t instead of n nodes by sending a local broadcast request to obtain service. Once
a certificate is issued, it is trusted by the whole network since it has been signed by the
same private-key. Thus, a well-defined issuing policy is needed to control certificate
issuing.
Hubaux el al.[36] suggested a scheme similar to Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)
scheme [41] in which there is no concept of centralized CA and each node acts as its own
CA. Every node will build its own "Web o f Trust;" thus, there is no longer a well known
trusted third party, as in the case of conventional PKI.

1.2.

Motivation and Objectives

In the previous section, we showed various approaches that consider solving key
management problems associated with MANET. We think that they all share the
shortcoming of favoring security against availability or vise versa.
Zhou and Haas [73] introduced a novel concept o f providing a robust CA service
by disseminating the key over several servers using threshold cryptographic techniques.
Although their work addressed security and fault tolerance issues, the scheme is
conceptual, and the connectivity between clients and CA servers has not been addressed.
Yi and Kravets [70] extended COCA concepts and have provided detailed performance
evaluation to their work and compare it to their earlier prototype which is based on pure
flooding [71]. The performance criteria for evaluating MOCA was to measure the ratio of
certificate requests and reply messages over the total messages obtained when pure
flooding is used. The MOCA scheme was 5-30% more efficient than pure flooding in
terms o f packet overhead. On the other hand, the URSA [43] scheme has solved the
problem of availability by allowing any t nodes to sign certificates, assuming that at least
t one-hop neighbors are available. As a consequence, they made t small to guarantee
availability, system security is sacrificed. The Hubaux [36] solution is suitable for small
self-organized networks in which every node builds its own trust relations, and it has the
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shortcoming of scalability and the lack of a definite trust anchor (i.e. CA) which is trusted
automatically by definition. Moreover, the framework does not use threshold
cryptography, but we mention it to complete our coverage o f the subject. We are going to
elaborate more on the abovementioned work in Section 3.
We believe that there is room for improvement, and such enhancements could be
accomplished by trying to make CA services have better performance while enjoying
similar security. Here, we are presenting our work, CACMAN, which stands for
"CAching Certificates in Mobile Ad-hoc Networks;" and the objective o f this work could
be stated as follows:
The aim o f CACMAN is to minimize the burden o f adapting CA services
in MANET and reduce packet overhead while maintaining high
availability o f the service without compromising its security.
This goal has been reached by allowing clients to share some responsibilities with
CA servers by cooperatively caching portions o f the certificates generated by CA servers.
The characteristics of certificates, such as relatively long validity periods and modest
storage requirements, can make caching a reasonable solution to reduce the burden of
offering highly available and secure services by relieving CA servers from some o f their
duties. Our cashing-based framework has addressed the security and performance
challenges of providing CA services in MANET.

1.3.

Methodology, Result, and Contribution

CACMAN can be viewed as a hybrid between URSA and MOCA that boasts the best of
both worlds, i.e. the availability of the former and the security o f the latter. Such fusion,
supported with novel techniques, shows CACMAN's strength. We chose adhering to
secret sharing principles to reach our objective, and we have provided quantitative
measurements showing how CACMAN contribute to solving the aforementioned
problems. Network simulator NS-2 [47] is been used to implement CACMAN and
enabled us to evaluate the significant o f various parameters in relation to our objectives.
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CACMAN have two major operations: Certificate Request (CREQ) and
Certificate Reply (CREP). Any client that wants to obtain another principal's certificate
will search its own cache to see if it has this certificate; otherwise, it will identify the
missing partial certificates and proceed by sending CREQ by local broadcast. Every
CACMAN client that receives a CREQ message inspects its cache for a possible hit, and
a CREP is sent back to the requester if a full or partial certificate(s) is found for the
subject. After that, the client waits for a specified time; if it receives sufficient responses,
then it reconstructs the certificate. If the requester times out because it has not received
sufficient partials, or the reconstruction step has failed, then it may try to contact CA
servers by flooding the network or by sending unicast messages. Otherwise, it reports a
failure to the client or retries later.
The novelty of CACMAN is based on the concept o f applying caching techniques
to boost the performance o f CA service. We proposed and implemented several
techniques starting with "CACMAN-basic" model and extending it to "CACMAN XReplies," "CACMAN Lazy-Replies with Cancellation," and "Cache-Focus" variants.
Those techniques and enhancements vary in their requirements, assumptions, overhead,
and tradeoffs. Every proposed technique is supported by NS-2 simulation results. We also
show the consequences of implementing revocation schemes in our work and discuss
different design and deployment issues.
We can summarize our contributions in this dissertation into the following main
points:
1) Reducing Network Overhead. CACMAN is able to achieve a significant
reduction of packet overhead which varies with every configuration between
74% and 91% as compared to other related protocols.
2) Reducing Servers' Overhead: Simulation results show significant decrease on
CA servers' load which enabled us to achieve the following desired goals:
a. Fewer Requests per CA : This was due to clients' contribution in which
they took part o f CA responsibilities and volunteered portions of their
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memory to cache certificates. CA load has been reduced dramatically
compared to MOCA and flooding.
b. Allowing more Offline Time: In CACMAN, a CA server is no longer
required to be online to provide a continuous service and it can go
offline for maintenance or to reduce its physical exposure to threats.
3) Separating Availability from Security: the value of t in a threshold-based
secret-sharing system controls the two aspects of the system which we want to
keep as high as possible. Unfortunately, they are inversely proportional (i.e.
availability vs. security). In CACMAN, we are able to make balance
availability and security.
4) Maintaining High Availability. CACMAN allows service to be up most o f the
time, even if most of the CA servers are destroyed (we simulated the scenario
where 20 out of 30 CA were damaged) without noticeable degradation of
performance.
5) Reducing Response Time: Our framework is able to achieve higher response
time, up to 16 times faster, than other related frameworks based on our
simulation results.
6) Obeying Security Requirements: In CACMAN, we obeyed most o f the
security assumptions of related work, such as threshold concepts.
Table I shows how CACMAN can maintain a high success ratio for certificate requests
with much lower packet overhead as compared to MOCA (reported in the first row).
Notice that while success rates are comparable to MOCA, network traffic overhead is
reduced.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

9

Table I
S a m p le v a l u e s f o r C A C M A N c o m p a r e d t o r e l a t e d w o r k ( t - 1 5 )

M odel
MOCA Closest unicast
1 CACMAN basic, 150 cache size
CACMAN all-reps, 150 cache size
I CACMAN basic, 225 cache size
1 CACMAN all-reps, 225 cache size

1.4.

Ratio to
flooding
86.2%
9.7%
14.7%
11.1%
20%

Success Ratio
77%
63.3%
78.9%
73.9%
89%

Dissertation Outline

The organization of the dissertation is as follows: In Section 2, the necessary background
that covers MANET security essentials and basics is given. It starts by discussing
Public/Private-key cryptography and how it differs from conventional methods. The PKI
that governs key deployment and management is also discussed with some focus on
validation and revoking schemes. A mathematical overview of how to share a key
between multiple parties is presented with more description on how to make it more
practical and robust. The section also introduces some characteristics and challenges o f
MANET followed by a closer look at routing challenges. Then, the focus is on various
MANET specific security challenges, like availability, routing, intrusion detection, and
key management. Section 3 gives more attention to various key management schemes
and discusses related work (e.g. URSA, COCA, and MOCA). Section 4 is devoted to our
proposed solution, CACMAN, from a design perspective . It begins with a detailed
description of our framework followed by its assumptions. Protocol description is given
followed by a discussion of alternative ways o f communication. Various enhancements to
CACMAN are presented, followed by a discussion of the impact o f applying different
revocation schemes. The section continues with a discussion of other miscellaneous
issues that affect the implementation of the framework, followed by sketches of practical
deployment scenarios. Section 5 compares CACMAN performance to related work. It
begins by describing the simulation environment and how we conducted the experiments
followed by simulation assumptions. The results of simulating various CACMAN
enhancements and other configurations are visualized and tabulated accompanied by a
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detailed analysis. Section 6 contains the conclusion and possibilities for future work. This
thesis also contains appendices that show further details and other aspects of our work.
Appendix A contains an overview o f the simulation environment used to implement
CACMAN. Appendix B contains the implementation information for CACMAN.
Although it can be presented as a separate section, we preferred to move the design and
implementation details to appendices as it does not affect the basic understanding of the
work.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

11

SECTION 2
BACKGROUND
This section is a presentation of some preliminary background. It will cover three general
areas: security related background, MANET overview, their fusion, MANET security.
Security in MANET has received a lot of attention and the problem is clearly so
broad that it is difficult to reach a single general solution. Thus, each proposal addresses
the issue from a different perspective accompanied by different assumptions. Solutions
are diverse as they focus on various aspects of MANET stack targeting application, endto-end, routing, or MAC level security problems.
The organization of this section will be as follows: Section 2.1 is a cryptography
introduction. Section 2.2 is a general overview o f Public-key Infrastructure (PKI). In
Section 2.3, we will focus on certificate revocation mechanisms. Section 2.4 is a brief
background of secret sharing. Section 2.5 is dedicated to showing how to use secret
sharing practically to do cryptographic operations. Section 2.6 is a general overview of
MANET. Section 2.7 will cover general security problems faced in MANET, and Section
2.8 is a summary.

2.1.

Public-Key Cryptography

Cryptographic functions are categorized into three types: secret key functions, public-key
functions, and hash functions [41]. The difference among these functions is represented
in Fig. 1. In this section, we will refer to pubic/private-key cryptography more often than
other schemes; thus, we will cover a few more details about it. Usually, each principal
has two pairs of keys, i.e. public and private. The public-key, as the name reflects, is
known by others, and the private-key is known only to its owner. When someone wants
to send an encrypted message so that no one other than the receiver can view it, the
sender will use the public-key o f the receiver to encrypt the message. For the principal to
decrypt the message, it should use its private-key to decrypt it.
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Plaintext
“Hello World”
(a)
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« ey
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^
^
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Public-Key
(b)

Public/Private Key
Private-Key
Ciphertext
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Plaintext
“Hello World”

(c)

Plaintext
“Hello World”

d ecry p tio n

hashing

^

D igest
“#$@ % !#$% A#*”

Hashing

Fig. 1. (a) Secret key crypto (also known as symmetric key cryptography), (b) public/private cryptography
(also known as asymmetric cryptography), (c) Hash function.

Public/Private-key cryptography has interesting properties which broaden its
usability and applications. When a principal applies its own private-key to a message,
other principal could verify that the message has not been changed by applying the
public-key of the former which will lead to the original message. This operation is called
signing and is very useful for proving integrity. Public-key cryptography is based on
modular exponentiation. Without getting into its mathematical details, we will describe
how the famous public/private cryptographic scheme RSA [41] works. First, we choose
two large prime numbers p and q then multiply them to get n (i.e. n = pq) . To generate
the public-key, we choose a number e that is relatively prime to (f>{n) where
t/>(n) = (p - \){q - 1). Now the public key is (e,«) and the private-key is the multiplicative
inverse of em od tf){n) , denoted as ( d, n) . To get the ciphertext c for the plaintext m , we
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do m e = c. To decrypt the message, we just need to c d = m. This works because
c d = (m e) d = m l = m .

2.2.

Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI)

Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) is a mechanism that offers the necessary components to
generate, distribute, and control public-keys securely and confidentially (e.g. [5], [6]).
An ideal PKI [41] consists of the following components:
1) Certificates: A certificate is a digitally signed statement binding the keyholder's (i.e. principal's) name to a public-key issued by a trusted entity.
However, the notion o f a certificate has been expanded to include attributes
other than key-holder such as nickname, email, account number, address,
photo, or a combination o f any other attributes [64],
2) Certificates Authority (CA): This is a repository and trusted entity that issues
and signs certificates. The public-key of the CA is known and trusted by all
nodes so that a node can verify any signed certificate issued by that CA.
Certificates can be stored in any convenient location, such as the directory
service [41].
3) Revoking Scheme: In some occasions, valid certificates need to be revoked
due to business and/or security reasons. Usually revoked certificates are
published in Certificate Revocation List (CRL). There exist some disputes
against CRL and this was a point of controversy [64] [48], However, CRL is
still used widely in various PKI implementations.
4) Certificate Evaluating Method: This is an evaluation scheme to validate a
certificate chain of public-keys in advance that are known and trusted by their
target name [41].
Even though some deployed PKI systems may leave out some components such
as revocation, they are still called PKI systems, and this will not affect this discussion.
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2.3.

Dissemination of Revoking Information: CRL and Validation

Schemes
Usually, every certificate has an expiration date that varies between few minutes to few
years. On some occasions, it is necessary to revoke an unexpired certificate. If a
principal's private-key is exposed, the principal is no longer under the administration
domain of a given CA, or some o f the certificate properties associated to that principal
need to be changed are some examples that necessitates existence o f a revocation
mechanism.
CRL is a signed list of revoked unexpired certificates [41]. This list is distributed
periodically to interested principals. CRL is a negative statement about the validity of the
certificates it contains and, hence, any certificate that is not in the CRL is considered
valid (a double negative). The problem of efficiently distrusting CRL has been addressed
by researchers (e.g. [49],[52]). CRL could be eliminated by introducing a component
dedicated to answering queries regarding certificates status.
The following list briefly illustrates the most common CRL distribution and
certificates validation mechanisms:
1) Basic CRL: CA issues a list containing the serial numbers o f revoked but
unexpired certificates which contains the next issuance date. All revoked
unexpired certificates will be listed again when the time o f the next issuance
occurs.
2) Delta CRL: This was introduced to reduce the bandwidth and redundancy
associated with sending a complete list every time an update occurs. Instead, a
delta CRL contains the changes from the last baseline CRL. Therefore, it is
usually short and often contains no certificates [41].
3) First Valid Certificate: The scheme goal, again, is to make the CRL as small
as possible and to allow certificates not to have a predetermined expiration
time when issued. When the size o f the CRL becomes too large, the CA will
issue a notice requesting any principal which holds a certificate with a serial
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number less than n to reissue a new certificate within some time from the date
of that notice. The number n is chosen in a manner that only few serial
numbers in the current CRL are greater than n. Revoked certificates with
serial numbers greater than n must continue to appear in the new CRL [41].
4) Online Revocation Server [4] (OLRS): An OLRS could be a dedicated server
that can be queried to check the validity o f individual certificates. Typically,
the verifier will query OLRS to check the status of the certificate in question
online. However, if the OLRS is compromised, the worst the adversary could
do is to revoke some valid certificates, given that the OLRS and CA use
different keys. A scheme proposed by Micali

[49]

overcomes the

shortcomings found in OLRS caused by cryptographic overhead by using the
public-key every time a status reply is issued.
5) Recertification: Mukkamala et al. [52] present a technique to increase the
validity of certificates without increasing the burden o f revocation by
introducing another entity called Recertification Authority (RCA). The CA
issues a certificate with a long validity period; however, the principal is
required to recertify at certain intervals from the RCA. This technique will
prevent the CA from reissuing short-lived certificates.
6) Counter Certificate: In situations where revocation is a rare event, the CA
could sign a counter certificate to revoke another certificate. However, the
counter certificate should be made known to all interested parties.

2.4.

Secret Sharing

Secret sharing (n ,t) , first indicated by Shamir [66], is a set o f n random shares for a
secret s such that it is possible to reconstruct s by the knowledge o f t shares where
t < n . Moreover, nothing could be derived about s' by the knowledge o f less than t
shares.
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Shamir's scheme is based on polynomial interpolation. Given t points in the 2dimentional plane (xi, y j): i e {1,..,?} an d x /s are distinct, there exists one and only one
polynomial p(x) of degree t - 1 such that p (x i) = y t for all i . Thus, if we pick a random
polynomial p {x) = a0 + axx + ...at^x'~x which has the degree t - 1 and we assignor,, - s ,
and evaluate: q{l) = sl,...,q{i) = st,...,q{n) = sn. By interpolation, we can find the
coefficients of p{x) and evaluate s = p{0) to retrieve the secret. Knowing t -1 or less is
not sufficient to calculates .

2.5.

Threshold Cryptography and Proactive Secret Sharing (PSS)

In the previous section, we showed the basic scheme for secret sharing. However,
sometimes it is desirable to hide s even from the principals (e.g. servers) themselves. Y.
Desmedt [26] showed how threshold cryptography can be used to perform cryptographic
operations such as signing or decrypting a message without exposing the private-key of
the service.
Here, we will give an example illustrated by Desmedt [26] to share RSA such that
t servers can sign messages independently and then the combiner will obtain the
complete signed message from those partially signed messages.
As a reminder, a cryptosystem is represented by a function that takes two inputs,
key and message, and the key provided as parameter, e.g. f kev {input) . In this example, it
is more convenient to make the key as an input so we have
fkey {input) = g input {key) ,

(1)

where / and g are cryptographic functions.
An important property for a threshold cryptographic function to be shared
practically is to be homomorphic, i.e .,
g b(k \ +k2) = gb(k i) * g b(k 2 )’

(2)
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where kx, k2 are keys and b is input.
Therefore, signing in RSA scheme will have g b(d) = bd m o d n , where b is
typically the digest of the message, d is the private-key, and n is the public modulus.
Since RSA secret sharing scheme is homomorphic, we have
key =

B)-(share,),

(3)

ieB

where B is a subset of the participants such that \B\ = t and Ct B is constant.
Thus, using (3) and (2) we have:

ieB

ieB

^

c

(4)

ieB

= n ^ > cieB

As we have seen in (4), a server that holds a share d x will sign a message using its
partial-key and sends the results with its identity (i.e., i) to the combiner. If the combiner
has received sufficient responses (i.e.t), and by knowing CiB, the combiner will use (4)
to sign or decrypt the message.
Another issue that should be considered in threshold secret sharing schemes is
robustness against the case of one or more shareholders sending erroneous partial results.
Again, as Desmedt [26] has pointed out in his survey paper, some schemes can be used to
recover/discover erroneous results without exhaustive search.
Threshold secret sharing has some desirable properties [43] in MANET which
make their combination worth noting:
1) Distributed Control and Security: A key feature in MANET is the absence o f
centralized control and the distribution of system management o f the system is
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consistent with the nature of MANET. To satisfy the ubiquitous nature of
MANET, distributing the secret to various nodes would increase availability.
2) Security vs1. Availability: The threshold t is the balance point between service
availability and security. An adversary group must destroy n - t + l share
holders to turn off certification services, and break t servers to steal the
secret.
Elowever, secret sharing by itself does not defend against mobile adversaries
[74],[57] in which the adversary moves to a node after compromising another for a
limited time doing similar damage. By the time the adversary gains access to t nodes (t
shares), the whole system is considered compromised. To enhance the security of the
system, a proactive approach has been introduced by [39] to address this problem.
Principals should refresh their shares to the same secret periodically in a way that old
shares cannot be combined with the new ones to build the secret. The time between two
refreshments is called window o f vulnerability, and for the adversary to take control of
the system, it must compromise at least t principals no later than one window of
vulnerability period.
A brief explanation by [26] shows how to refresh the shares in homomorphic
secret sharing schemes as follows:
If (sj,s2,...,s/) is a share assignment for the key k and ( j p ^ - j ^ i s another
uniformly random

share

assignment for the

"key"

0

(zero), then

we have

(sl,s"2,...,s") = (sl + s[,s2 +s'2,...,s, +£,') for the same key k .
However, if we restrict the process o f generating shares to one principal, the
system will have a single point o f failure if that principal got compromised since it could
generate wrong shares. Hence,

t

correct servers should generate their shares

(s'j^s'j 2,—,s'j:,) where j e t and exchange the shares with all servers. Thus, the resulting
share will be s ”= y. + ^ /eiSf , , and it is an independent new share for the same key as
depicted in figure above. However, each shareholder needs to prove that its contribution
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(s[,s'2,...,s'j) is indeed a share of zero, since compromised principals may send bogus
shares or do not even send shares at all! Luckily, verifiable secret sharing (VSS) schemes
could be used such as [61] in which the principal can verify and testify to the correctness
of the corresponding shares without disclosing them by adding some other public
information.

Fig. 2. Key refreshing sketch. Each server will generate shares for a random polynomial for the key zero
(grouped by dotted line). Those shares are sent to corresponding servers and each one will combine the
shares it received to construct its new share.

2.6.

Overview of Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET)

MANET is a network architecture that can be deployed rapidly without any required
fixed networking infrastructure. The nodes in MANET model share some unique
characteristics such as mobility and joining/leaving the network very frequently, resulting
in rapid changes to its topology. Moreover, nodes in MANET usually have constraints on
their computation, storage, and power capabilities [32].
MANET is useful in situations like rescue missions, fast establishment of military
forces, and national crises when the underlying infrastructure is no longer an option due
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the damages done by natural or other disasters. In addition, MANET has some interesting
commercial usages in which it could be more feasible than wired networks especially in
short-term occasions such exhibitions, conferences, or festivals [32],
In MANET, nodes could be any entities such as soldiers, rescue team members,
planes, trains, and ships which may possess significant variations in node speeds and
moving patterns, ranging from stationary nodes to aircraft speeds, and from
predetermined paths such as highways to unpredictable path such as rescue helicopters
maneuvering around a disaster area. Even with such extreme conditions, MANET is
expected to deliver a variety o f traffic types including delay/bandwidth sensitive
applications such as voice or video [32].

N etw ork
Connectivity

Satillite

Cellular i WLAN

MANET

Sensor

Fig. 3. Taxonomy o f computer networking.

Moreover, MANET operates entirely through wireless medium and lacks
centralized entities found in traditional cellular wireless networks such as base stations,
MSC, HLR, and VLR (i.e. Mobile Switch Center, Home Location Registers, and Visitor
Location Register respectively). Those entities are usually connected through hi-speed
wired links and the wireless is used at the edge only (i.e. between the end-user and the
base station).A wireless sensor network [7] is another more restricted environment with
different assumptions which shares some o f MANET constraints. Nodes are tiny devices
deployed massively in a given place with no identification [56], In Fig. 3, we represent a
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general classification for networking systems to show where MANET fits. An example of
current implementation of MANET includes IEEE 802.11 [2] and Bluetooth [1],
2.6.1

MANE T characteristics

To distinguish MANET from its siblings, some assumptions that characterize MANET
are listed here [32]:
1) Power Source: Nodes are equipped with portable communication devices and
usually powered by batteries. Thus, limited battery life could restrict the
transmission range, communication activity and computational power of the
node.
2) Transitivity: Connectivity between nodes is not transitive; i.e., if node A can
communicate directly with node B and node B can communicate directly with
node C, then A is not necessarily able to communicate with C directly1.
3) Fixed ID: All nodes are identified by fixed IDs such as IP addresses2.
4) Locality Assumption: Usually, a large portion o f the traffic will be between
geographically close nodes although it is not prohibited to establish a
connection among distinct nodes.
Thus, MANET imposes some requirements in design such as a robust routing and
mobility management algorithms to increase reliability and availability. Moreover, any
protocol or algorithm designed for MANET should have low overhead to reduce power
consumption.
2.6.2

Routing in MANET

MANET introduces many challenges in designing reliable routing protocols due to
frequent topology changes, power limitations, computation capabilities, and bandwidth.

1 For example, transitivity holds in Ethernet since all nodes share the same medium.
2 Some models, such as sensor network, do not require nodes to have an ID. Therefore, this assumption
is not a luxury.
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Those limitations impose a theme in MANET routing protocol design to favor algorithms
which are low in overhead, adaptive, and robust [32],
MANET routing protocols could be classified as proactive or reactive [32].
Proactive protocols continuously exchange topological information among network nodes
to keep routes as accurate as possible. Thus, all routing information is available
immediately for any given node. Some example o f such protocols include Optimized
Link State Routing Protocol (OLSR) [37] and Wireless Routing Protocol (WRP) [53], On
the other hand, reactive protocols such as Dynamic Source Routing protocol (DSR) [16]
and A d hoc On-demand Distance Vector Routing protocol (AODV) [63] establish route
on-the-fly and they do not attempt to maintain up-to-date topology o f the network.
Instead, they establish routes only when necessary. A hybrid approach also has been
proposed, for example, a node in Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP)[62] proactively maintains
topology to close neighbors and acts reactively for nodes that reside far away.
Another classification for MANET routing protocols is based on whether they are
location aware3 or not [32]. Examples of location aware protocols include LocatingAided Routing (LAR)[42] and Distance Routing Effect Algorithm for Mobility
(DREAM)[12].
2.6.3

A d hoc On-demand Distance Vector (A OD V)

The previous section gives a general overview o f routing protocols found in MANET.
This section will give expanded overview o f the AODV routing protocol because we
have used it in our work as the network layer in our simulation.
AODV is a reactive protocol that could be viewed as a variant o f the well known
distance vector routing protocol [67]. The AODV objectives are to broadcast discovery
packets only when necessary. Neighbors exchange local broadcast packets called hello
messages. The routing tables of the nodes are organized to optimize response time for
local node movements and new route establishments. AODV assumes links are

3 They could be equipped with an external device such as GPS to obtain their geographic location.
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bidirectional. It uses a broadcast route discovery mechanism similar to DSR. The path
discovery process in AODV is initiated when a source node wants to establish a
connection to a destination node and no route is cached in the source table. It sends a
route discovery packet (RREQ) to its local neighbors. The RREQ contains the source
address, source sequence number, broadcast id, destination address, destination sequence,
and hop count. Source address and broadcast ID fields uniquely distinguish a RREQ.
Broadcast ID is incremented every time the node sends a new RREQ. Each node that
receives a RREQ message either sends a route reply (RREP) if it knows a route to the
destination, or it rebroadcasts the RREQ after decrementing the hop count (i.e. expanding
ring search procedure). However, if a node receives duplicate RREQs from different
neighbors, then it should forward only the necessary ones. After broadcasting the RREQ,
it creates an entry in order to implement the reverse path setup that contains destination
IP address, source IP address, broadcast ID, expiration time for that entry, and source
node's sequence number. When the RREQ arrives at a node (possibly the destination), it
checks whether the RREQ was received over a bi-directional link. Then, if the node has a
route entry to the destination, it compares the destination sequence number o f the RREQ
with the one it has. If the sequence number it has is less than the one it just received, it
should rebroadcast the RREQ. Otherwise, it replies its cached route back to the sender to
establish the forward path [63].

2.7.

MANET Security

2.7.1

Security Difficulties in MANET

L. Buttyan and J. Hubaux [18] discussed security issues in MANET and they refer to the
following reasons to justify why it is difficult to secure such network:
1) Channel Vulnerability: Wireless channels are vulnerable to eavesdropping and
the injection of faked messages without any physical access.
2) Node Vulnerability: By not residing in a physically protected place, nodes can
be captured and compromised easily by attackers.
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3) Absence o f Infrastructure: Classical security methods that require an
infrastructure are no longer useful due to the distributed nature o f MANET.
4) Dynamic Topology: This is a fact in MANET, and it makes routing difficult
since incorrect routing information can be generated easily by compromised
nodes making it difficult to distinguish this case from legitimate topology
changes caused by mobility.
2.7.2

Availability

Availability has been addressed from different perspective and MANET is vulnerable to
DoS attacks by abusing communication protocols which lead to a reduction of honest
node performance or clogging the access to a needed server.
If we take the MAC layer protocol of 802.11 [2] as an example for typical
MANET, nodes exchange RTS and CTS packets to reserve the channel before
transmission. However, a node transmitting a packet must backoff for randomly selected
period b which is between 0 and CW (Contention Window). If collision happened, CW is
doubled. Misbehaving nodes can take the advantage of the algorithm to increase their
throughput by not respecting the protocol and choose small values to shorten the backoff
time and increase their probability of getting the channel. This problem has been stated
and studied by P. Kysanur and N. Vaidya [44], and they developed a solution to detect
malicious behavior by using a traffic analysis scheme.
Another approach, which applies game-theoretic concepts, considers the
following dilemma: Cooperation will consume resources, and it might result in a
disadvantage, but if all nodes did not cooperate, the result is bad for all nodes. This
dilemma was the basis for designing Cooperation O f Nodes, Fairness In Dynamic Ad-hoc
NeT-works (CONFIDANT) protocol [17]. Each node will learn and observe misbehaving
nodes by monitoring the observations and reputation records generated by others. For
example, if a node believes that another is misbehaving, then it can take action in terms
of packet forwarding to avoid routing through that node, or it can report this behavior to
another node by sending alarm messages about the node in question. The authors showed,
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by using simulation models, that CONFIDANT can cope well even when half of the
nodes are misbehaving.
2 .7.3

Secure Routing

Originally, MANET routing protocols like DSR [16], AODV [63], OLSR [37], WRP
[53], ZRP [62], LAR [42], and DREAM [12] were examples of classic MANET routing
protocols that have been proposed to be robust against topology changes, but none of
these have applied measurements to defend against attacking route information [73]. A
malicious node can learn the network topology by monitoring routing messages to
conduct an attack that brings the network down. For example, it can inject bogus routing
information, reply old information, or distorting routing information [73]. Defending
against routing attacks is hard because it is difficult to tell if invalid routing information
is caused by a topology change or a compromised node. Another interesting type o f
attack is a "wormhole" attack (Y. Hu and et al. [33]) in which attackers tunnel routing
and other traffic in one location and release them in other part o f the network which
damages the topology. The authors proposed a solution to this type o f attack by the use o f
"packet leashes" in which geographical and/or temporal information are included,
allowing the receiver to determine if the packet has traversed a realistic distance or not.
Secure-AODV [72] has been introduced as an extension to AODV routing
protocol to protect the routing protocol's messages. Every node is assumed to have a
certified public-key for all other nodes. The sender o f any routing message will sign the
packet and include some information generated by hashing function in a way that
guarantees no intermediate node can decrement the hop count to solicit traffic by
advertising a shorter path and other solutions (e.g. [59], [33], [34], [65]) which aim to
provide solutions to various routing security problems.
2 .7.4

Intrusion Detection

Encryption and Authentication are considered as intrusion prevention mechanisms.
However, sometimes nodes get compromised, and their private-keys are exposed, which
means the system is no longer secure. Thus, intrusion detection measures are required to
overcome this problem. In high-security networks, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are
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necessary as a last line of defense [75], However, classic IDS are inadequate for MANET
since they rely on real-time traffic analysis for packet traces collected from switches,
routers, and gateways. Unfortunately, MANET lacks such infrastructure, and there are no
physical boundaries for the system. Thus, the only way to collect data is to let nodes
monitor traffic, which takes place in their radio range. MANET, due to its dynamic
nature, requires an IDS solution to be fully distributed, be able to analyze local audit data,
and make sure that it can distinguishes the thin line between anomaly and normal
behavior. Y. Zhang and W. Lee [75] [76] addressed these issues by developing a new
architecture called Distributed and Cooperative Intrusion Detection and evaluated its
ability to detect intrusion. Each node has an IDS agent, and those agents collaborate to
secure the system. Using simulation, the system has been evaluated to detect routing
attack, packet attack, and no attack to measure false alarms. Their simulation shows very
useful results and detected 99% o f the attacks with less than 1% o f false alarms.

2.8.

Summary

This section has presented necessary background related to our work. A general overview
of encryption and public/private-key cryptography has been shown followed by an
overview of PKI and a review of its main components. We dedicated a section to discuss
revoking schemes and gave brief details about each one. A description o f the Shamir
scheme o f secret sharing has been given with a detailed example. We followed that
section with a description of threshold cryptography and how to make it practical using
proactive secret sharing techniques. Another section was devoted to MANET and its
importance, challenges, and characteristics. Taxonomy of routing protocols in MANET
was given with a special focus on AODV protocol. We continued our discussion on
security problems in MANET and gave examples o f availability problems, secure
routing, and intrusion detection techniques. We will delay discussing solutions for
providing general public-key services until the next section as those are considered
related work.
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SECTION 3
RELATED WORK
The aim o f this section is to discuss the attempts to adapt public-key solutions into
MANET. We will begin with a proposal to secure closed-networks in Section 3.1.
Section 3.2 is about certificate-based security for self-organized networks. Sections 3.3,
3.4, and 3.5 are dedicated to discussing URSA, COCA, and MOCA respectively, which
are designed to address the problem o f applying online CA into MANET. Finally,
concluding remarks are in Section 3.6.

3.1.

Closed-Network Solutions

Closed-Network is a kind of network in which the number and the identity o f participants
are known a priori. The benefit o f such a classification is that it allows security features
to be implanted or agreed upon in advance since all information is known. For example,
Asokan and Ginzboorg [11] have proposed a solution for establishing a secure ad hoc
network without access to a public-key infrastructure. They gave a scenario of a small
group of people (each one with a laptop) meeting in a classroom and wanting to
communicate securely. To achieve that goal, they need to agree on a password and use it
for that session (e.g. write it down on the blackboard).
Hu et al. [34] proposed more automated ways to do secure routing with publickeys by preloading every node with the public-keys o f all other participants as part of the
initialization phase for their proposal. The problem of such an approach is flexibility
since new nodes cannot be added to the network. They have suggested another
modification by allowing an offline CA to certify nodes; therefore, nodes can authenticate
each other by certificates signed by that CA.
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3.2.

Self-Organized Solutions

The term Self-Organized security is used to refer to a setting where there is no central
authority to control the establishment and/or releasing of security associations and it is up
to each node to decide which other node(s) to trust or communicate with [20] by making
each one act as a self-CA.
The first solution for the self-organized public-key management system for
MANET which is similar to PGP [41] was suggested by Hubaux et al.[36], Users issue
certificates to each other based on some kind of contact such as personal, social,
friendship, relational or association (represented in each node by a directed edge in the
node trust graph). Each user maintains a local certificate repository, and when two users
want to verify each other, they exchange their local repositories (i.e. their digraphs) and
try to find appropriate certificate chains connecting both ends in the resulting merged
graph. Hubaux et al. have suggested an efficient method, The Shortcut Hunter algorithm,
to find the shortest path between any two principals (i.e. nodes). The framework assumed
that nodes are honest and will not issue false certificates, but the authors have suggested
some metrics when that assumption is relaxed.

3.3.

Ubiquitous and Robust Security Architecture (URSA)

The goal of Kong's et al. [43] is to provide pervasive CA services by making all n nodes
in the network share CA functionality. All participants sharing the private-key is
obviously unfeasible and not realistic since t = n (i.e. only one node needs to be
compromised to deny the service). To overcome this problem, the same private-key is
distributed among coalitions (as referenced in URSA), and each one has at least t
member nodes, which are one hop apart from each other. Thus, a client needs to contact
t nodes only, rather than n , by sending a local broadcast request and collecting t replies
to obtain the service.
This scheme has an adapted RSA-based design for cryptographic operations. The
CA service has a single private-key for signing certificates and it is not known, as a
whole, to any member node of the MANET. However, any t nodes at a given coalition
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can collectively act as a CA by using their shares to sign certificates and every node has
its own public/private-key to do end-to-end security functions (e.g. encrypting or signing
messages as an individual).
Nodes obtain their shares either when bootstrapping the system or using self
initialization algorithm. At the startup of the system, a centralized management, also
known as "trusted dealer," will distribute t shares to t nodes just before forming the
MANET. After initializing those t nodes, the centralized management is no longer
needed, and any additional uninitialized node can retrieve its secret share by sending a
one-hop local broadcast to a coalition of t nodes. They then send their partially signed
certificates back to the requester. Once the requester collects t partial certificates, it
reconstructs the complete certificate. However, once a certificate is issued, it is trusted by
the entire; network, therefore, a well defined issuing policy is needed to control the
issuing o f certificates.
Certificate renewal must be done before its expiration time by presenting a valid
unexpired certificate to a coalition. Then, the coalition will check its CRL, verify the
certificate, and issue a new certificate with a new, later, expiration time.
A certificate is implicitly revoked when it is expired and explicit revocation is
handled by an issuance of a counter certificate that flooded into the network. Besides
flooding, neighbors can safely exchange their local CRL cache to build a more complete
CRL.
From a security point of view, the adversary group will not have the secret if less
than t nodes are compromised. Proactive Secret Sharing (PSS) protocol is used to
prevent the adversary from learning the service private-key in the long term with the
assumption that it cannot compromise more than t - 1 between any two consecutive
secret-sharing updates. Additionally, it is easy for a client to verify whether the
reconstructed certificate is correct or not.
URSA assumes that t one-hop neighbors or more usually exist. Nevertheless, in a
mobile environment, this may not be the case, and Kong et al. suggest that if the client
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does not receive sufficient response, within some time limit, then it should move to
another location and try another coalition.
The authors provided Unix and NS-2 [47] implementations for URSA to measure
cryptographic and mobility costs respectively. They simulated network topologies, which
have 30 to 100 nodes and mobility between 1 to 20 m/sec for 5 minutes using a random
waypoint. The value of t was chosen to be 3 when simulating a 30 node scenario and 5
otherwise. The success ratio is almost 100% for all variations.

3.4.

Cornell Online Certificate Authority (COCA)

COCA [74] is a secure online certification authority that was originally designed and
deployed in LANs and the Internet. The designers made weak assumptions4 regarding the
environment in which COCA can operate. No assumption has been made about execution
speed and message delivery delays. COCA applies some traditional means to defend
against denials-of-service attacks such as processing authenticated requests only, caching
results of expensive cryptographic operations, and multiplexing resources to balance the
demand of various classes of requests.
COCA is the first system that integrates a Byzantine quorum system [46] with
threshold cryptography and addresses some problems that arise when combining the two.
Additionally, the authors have demonstrated experimentally the difficulty o f launching
successful attack against their system.
A certificate request sent by a client is received by a selected COCA server, called
the delegate, which forwards the request to all COCA servers. Then, it waits for signed
partial certificates from a quorum o f COCA servers. Once those partials have been
received by the delegate, it invokes COCA's threshold signature protocol to sign that

4 i.e. the protocol, theoretically, will converge to a stable state regardless o f how long it takes to go to
that state. One such weak assumption is that a correct message will eventually be delivered when sent
repeatedly.
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certificate. To update certificate information, the delegate will need further steps, which
are discussed in more detail at [74].
It is possible that the delegate itself can be compromised and deviated from the
protocol. Thus, the client needs to contact a other delegates to ensure that it will get at
least one correct response. However, in normal circumstances, the client may contact just
one delegate, a = 1, to do certificate operations. Zhou and Hass [73] sketched how to
deploy COCA in MANET, but they did not provide any performance results. The original
COCA protocol was written in "C" and they [74] provided some measurements for a
sample deployment of four machines with t set to one.

3.5.

Mobile Certificate Authority (MOCA)

MOCA [70] was created taking a MANET environment into consideration as an
extension to an earlier prototype [71]. A MOCA is a mobile node within the MANET
selected to provide distributed CA functionality. Typically, more powerful and more
secure nodes are chosen to provide CA service to other nodes. MOCA nodes apply
threshold cryptography to share the responsibility and increase availability o f the
MANET. Client nodes use MP (MOCA certification Protocol) to contact sufficient
MOCAs and use their services.
When a client wants to contact another client, it sends "Certificate Request"
(CREQ) packets to t or more MOCA servers and waits for some time. Any MOCA
receiving a CREQ will reply by sending a "Certification Reply" (CREP) packet
containing its partial signature. Once the client receives t valid CREPs, it can reconstruct
the whole certificate. CREQ and CREP messages are similar to Route Request (RREQ)
and Route Reply (RREP) messages in on demand ad hoc routing protocols such as
AODV [63] andD SR[16],
To increase system availability, MOCA clients send /? unicast CREQ, where
P = t + a , and a is determined in each client by inspecting the status o f the network.
Moreover, to avoid flooding the network, clients inspect the route table to see if any
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cached routes to MOCAs are available, thus, making flooding the last resort. Yi and
Kravets [70] have tested several alternatives when the number o f cached routes to MOCA
servers is more than /?.
Yi and Kravets' performance criteria were to measure the ratio o f CREQ and
CREP messages in their scheme over the sum o f CREQ and CREP in pure flooding.
MOCA scheme has achieved a 5-30% improvement over pure flooding. We will discuss
their results in the next section.
It is worth mentioning that one minor technical difference between MOCA and
COCA frameworks is that the construction o f the certificate is done at the client side
which adds CPU overhead to MOCA clients, while the reconstruction is done at the
delegate server in the case of COCA framework.
Finally, we present an illustration to show the difference between some o f the
related work presented in this section.
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Fig. 4. A hypothetical request sent by a client (denoted by "C") to obtain a certificate from available CA
servers (denoted by circle labeled "CA") using various protocols, (a) COCA (b) MOCA (c) URSA.

Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 show, respectively, how a request and its reply would be handled
for a client to obtain a certificate for various protocols. Each packet sent is represented by
a black arrow and the light gray arrows in Fig. 4(a) represent a communication made by
the CA on behalf of the requesting client. We assume that the threshold is three (i.e. the
client needs at least three correct replies).
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Fig. 5. The replies sent by servers (denoted by "CA") back to the requester (denoted by circle labeled "C")
using various protocols, (a) COCA (b) MOCA (c) URSA.

3.6.

Conclusion

This section was dedicated to discussing related work adapting public-key and PKI
services into MANET. We have started the section by showing security solutions for a
small MANET followed by an overview o f a self-organizing key-management system.
We have expanded the discussion to include USRA, COCA, and MOCA to show more
relevant work to what we are proposing.
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SECTION 4
CACMAN FRAMEWORK
This section is dedicated to describing our framework from the design perspective.
Section 4.1 describes our motivation to develop "CAching Certificates in Mobile Ad hoc
Networks" (CACMAN). The system assumptions are listed in Section 4.2. Section 4.3
describes the CACMAN-basic protocol in depth. Other possible techniques for
implementing the CACMAN communication protocol are discussed in Section 4.4.
Variations and enhancements to the basic framework are given in Section 4.5. Section 4.6
discusses CRL techniques and the consequences when deployed in the framework.
Miscellaneous details such as key refreshing between CACMAN CAs and "partial
certificates compaction and redundancy removal" are addressed in Section 4.7. Section
4.8 illustrates deployment scenarios in hybrid-MANET. Section 4.9 is our conclusion.

4.1.

Motivation

Based on the discussion of related work found in Section 3, we strongly believe that there
is room for enhancing the performance and service availability of the CA service. The
main objective of this work is to reduce the amount of overhead (e.g. total number of
packets per request) associated with providing pervasive threshold based CA services
without significantly affecting its availability or compromising its security.
Closed-network (Section 3.1) and self-organized (Section 3.2) security solutions
are feasible for small size networks, but they cannot scale when the number of nodes is
large and/or the membership is dynamic. Moreover, self-organized solutions, though
elegant, are based on the transitivity o f trust security assumption (i.e. PGP-like) in which
there is no agreed third entity (or anchor point) that every principal will automatically
trust. Thus, self-organized solutions are suitable for securing personal communication at
the application level as noted by Capkun et al. [20], Moreover, when a node joins the
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network, it cannot start functioning unless it builds its own trust network, which takes a
considerable amount of time.
The URSA scheme (Section 3.3) is interesting but vulnerable because small
values for t were chosen to increase the availability of the system; however, this also
jeopardizes its security. Furthermore, finding one-hop t neighbors to obtain the service is
difficult especially when t is high. We believe that the tradeoff between availability and
robustness can be separated. Another shortcoming is that any issued certificate by any
coalition is trusted by definition, which is problematic since there is no known entity to
make the decision of issuing or revoking a certificate. Moreover, there is considerable
overhead for each node when joining/leaving a coalition every time it changes its
location. Besides, it is not known what a coalition member should do if the number o f the
members are less than t .
On the other hand, MOCA framework (Section 3.5) is useful but very expensive.
More specifically, we have major two concerns about MOCA. First, the number o f
MOCA nodes is relatively high, about 10-20% o f the total number o f participants.
Making such large number of CA servers to increase availability does not come without
consequences, such as the overhead associated with replica synchronization and key
refreshing between CAs, besides increasing physical exposure o f the system. Notice that
the flooding protocol [71] is independent o f the number of CAs and, hence, is not
sensitive to the number deployed in the field. Second, and more important, the ratio o f
MOCA Certificate Requests (CREQs) and Certificate Replies (CREPs) as compared to
flooding is high- at best 70%- when /? = 5 (remember t < /3 ) and « = 30 [70], In our
opinion, making a vital service that expensive is undesirable. COCA (Section 3.4) shares
the same shortcoming as MOCA.
The argument of Kong's et al. [43] against dedicated CA service (i.e. COCA and
MOCA) makes sense. They argued that high mobility will make contacting dedicated CA
servers in a timely fashion a non-trivial task. Besides, the CA could be multiple hops
away from the client, which increases latency.
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Our work, based on caching, could be viewed as an enhancement to overcome the
performance concerns regarding MOCA framework. The novelty o f such enhancement is
to maintain availability and efficiency of the system even when t is high -m ore secure
and less exposed to adversaries- without significant tradeoff to the network overhead by,
collaboratively, caching full and partially signed certificates5 into clients' memory. Our
work could be viewed as a hybrid between MOCA and URSA with more novel and
unique enhancements. Our protocol still needs CA servers, but also requires clients'
participation to enhance the service.
Caching has been used in various aspects o f computer systems, either as hardware
or a software component, to avoid many inherent delay penalties associated with the high
speed gap of various system components or to increase their availability in the case of a
failure that happened to other components. For instance, in MANET, caching of route
information has been used to reduce the overhead associated with flooding the network
by route discovery messages (e.g. DSR [16] and AODV [63]). Another usage o f caching
in MANET is to increase the availability of web services such as in [31], [13]. In our
case, we are trying to decrease the service overhead and power consumption associated
with such overhead.
We believe that certificate caching is an important concept due to following
factors:
1) Small Foot Print: A certificate consumes around lk, and this is a negligible
size compared to other objects (e.g. multimedia objects).
2) Long Validity: Usually certificates tend to have a relatively long life, about a
year, and this is a desirable property since it increases the ability o f clients to
cache them for long time without the necessity to purge them due to a new
update.

5 In this section, the terms 'share' and 'partial certificate' will be used interchangeably.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

38

3) Centralized Update Point: A certificate is usually updated by the CA only,
and this eliminates many problems associated with replicated data objects
when conflict update happens because the object is changed by different
entities at different locations.
Caching certificates is safe, and if an adversary compromises less than t
CACMAN CA servers and clients have cached the faked share generated by these
compromised CAs, then the faked shares will not reconstruct correctly. This could
increase the overhead for a client since it needs to identify the compromised shares.
However, schemes discussed by Desmedt [26] and additional cautions could be applied
like using misbehaver detection schemes (Section 2.7.2) to alleviate the problem.

4.2.

Framework Assumptions

This section lists the most important assumptions and conditions that make CACMAN
useful and practical. We would like to emphasize that many o f these assumptions are
found in related work.
1) CA Initialization: CA servers must be initialized by a trusted entity or some
Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) techniques are used to ensure correct partialkeys have been deployed and every CA indeed receives a valid share o f the
secret.
2) Window o f Vulnerability: Malicious node(s) cannot compromise more than t
CA servers at any given window o f vulnerability.
3) CA Role: CA in CACMAN is the same as in MOCA. We did not involve CA
servers in any optimization or enhancement so that we can measure
CACMAN clients' performance.
4) CA Cost: CA servers are expensive entities in the system and cannot be
deployed massively (e.g., many CA operations are of the order 0 ( n 2) ).
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5) Node Correctness: Nodes in CACMAN, at any given time, are either
malicious or correct. If a CACMAN node is correct, it will follow the
protocol. Otherwise, it will deviate from the protocol arbitrarily.
6) Security Essentiality: Security is an essential part o f the network and
certification services are used heavily in most services such as authentication,
sending messages, exchanging routing information, and so on6.
7) Bandwidth Limitation: The bandwidth and the delay in the underlying
MANET in which CACMAN is deployed is limited, and we are more
interested in trading storage to save some bandwidth.
8) Fair Links: is a communication channel exists by which if we send an enough
messages between any two points, some will arrive correctly [74], If no
message can arrive intact, it is impossible to build a useful communication
protocol. This assumption is reasonable and realistic for MANET.
9) Power Consumption: Sending a packet in MANET is an expensive operation
in terms of power consumption (e.g. sending a 1 kb data packet will consume
as much energy as processing 300 million instructions in some general
purpose [60] or PDA [3] microprocessor.
10) Open Network: CACMAN nodes do not necessarily know or trust each other
since assuming a self-organized or closed network will reduce the necessity o f
adapting PKI solution.
11) Online CAs: This assumption is to differentiate it from offline CA, as assumed
in some other public-key solutions (Sections 3.1 and 3.2).

6 Thus, a client may have more than one certificate, i.e. one for login and another for email. Therefore,
the reader should not assume one certificate per client, although we have assumed that in the simulation for
simplicity.
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12) Single CA Service: This assumption is to simplify the discussion without
losing generality. The performance evaluation for CACMAN has been done
with this consideration.
13) Servers Communication: CACMAN does not make any assumptions on how
servers are communicating with each other (e.g. multicast) for some
operations that require consensus such as key refreshing or signing CRLs.
14) MANET Assumptions: To avoid redundancy, MANET model assumptions
mentioned in Section 2.6.1 still hold in CACMAN.

4.3.

Protocol Description

Two important operations occur in every CACMAN node, CREQ and CREP7 which are
described here. When a client wants to obtain other client(s)' certificates to establish a
secure communication or to encrypt some messages, the following algorithm will be
executed:
1) It checks its own cache to find out the availability o f a complete certificate, or
it will identify the missing parts if partially signed certificates are found.
2) If there is no sufficient number of partially signed certificates, then it makes a
local broadcast. However, if it happens that the source has a short route to the
subject in question, it should favor sending the CREQ to that subject instead
of making a local broadcast.
3) Every client that receives a CREQ message inspects its cache for a possible
hit. It sends a CREP back to the sender if a full or any partial certificate is
found for the subject.

7 We are using the same abbreviations, CREQ and CREP, used in [70], to refer to 'Certificate Request'
and 'Certificate Reply' respectively.
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4) The request initiator waits for a specified time; if it receives sufficient
responses then it reconstructs the certificate. Notice that the client could
receive a complete certificate, which eliminates the reconstruction step but not
the verification. If the request initiator times out because insufficient partials
have been received or the reconstruction has failed, then the client may try to
contact CA servers by flooding the network or by sending unicast messages if
it has sufficient routes to them. Otherwise, it reports a failure to the client or
retries later.
The last step of the protocol is, somehow, open because, in our opinion, such
decisions should not be taken without knowing the application domain.
Fig. 6 illustrates the state diagram for CREQ operation as described in the
protocol.
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Fig. 6. State Diagram for CREQ operation in CACMAN. (Transition format is "cause / output")
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Fig. 7. State diagram for CREP (with X-Reps enhancement).

4.4.

Alternative Communication Paradigms

In Section 4.3, we mentioned that a CREQ is sent by local broadcast. However, it does
not mean that this is the only way of sending CREQs. Other possible alternatives to
contact CA servers or CACMAN, in no specific order, are8:
1) Unicast: a client will contact every server (CA or CACMAN) by sending
unicast CREQ messages.
2) Flooding: a CREQ will be flooded into the network and every server that
receives the request will send a reply.
3)

Scoped Flooding: a CREQ will flood the network but with controlled "Time
to Live" (TTL) to reduce the amount of overhead and still guarantee the
CREQ is received by a sufficient number o f servers.

8 O f course, these methods are generic, but we show them here in CACMAN context.
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4) Multicasting: a multicast tree is built between a client and all servers. A
CREQ will be sent to the tree and CREPs are sent back to the client. There is
overhead associated with maintaining and updating the multicast tree.
5) Scoped Multicasting: The main idea is similar to multicasting. However, once
a CREQ is sent, a TTL value associated with it is received by some CA
servers and does not necessarily reach every node in the tree, especially leaf
nodes.
The first and second method have been used in MOCA (Section 3.5) and the
remaining three are examined by Carter et al. [22] but in the context of manycast
problem. The performance of the first and second techniques are examined in Section 5
and compared to CACMAN. Carter et al. have shown that the forth and the fifth methods
were as expensive as flooding9!

4.5.

Variations and Enhancements

The previous section illustrated CACMAN in it basic form. Here, we will show some
enhancements that could be incorporated into the protocol to increase its performance.
Each of those enhancements, except the one in Section 4.5.4, has been simulated, and the
results are reported in Section 5.
4.5.1

X-Replies

Basically, instead of sending one CREP when a CACMAN server receives a CREQ, it
will send at most X different replies to the requester based on their availability if there is
no full certificate found. The reason behind this enhancement is to increase the likelihood
of getting all necessary shares to reconstruct the certificate and to make the chance o f
delivering more desired partials if the earlier one, though not identical, did not arrive due
to congestion or disconnection.

9 In that paper, the authors examined ADMR [40] as multicasting protocol.
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4.5.2

Lazy-Replies and Lazy-Replies with Cancellation

"Lazy-Replies" and "Lazy-Replies with Cancellation" share the goal o f reducing the
amount o f dropped packets caused by "reverse storm effect" [21] when packets arrive at
the originator from multiple links at the same time. This is done by allowing CACMAN
server to defer their CREPs, if they had any, once they receive a CREQ for a randomly
chosen period between 0 and 5 , similar to backoff algorithms used in various
networking protocols. The exclusive goal for "Lazy-Replies with Cancellation"
enhancement is to reduce packet overhead by allowing CACMAN client which had
sufficient number of replies, i.e. t , to broadcast a cancellation packet, after their CREQ,
notifying CACMAN server(s) that have scheduled their CREP(s) but not yet sent them to
disregard their outgoing CREP(s).
4.5.3

Cache-Focus

The goal of this enhancement is to understand the effect o f forcing some discriminative
rulings on which partials are allowed to be cached in CACMANs' memory. Intuitively,
we thought "Cache-Focus" would reduce the amount of duplicate packets sent by clients
due to possible similarities as in the basic protocol. In Cache-Focus, each client, once it
boots up, will choose one or more CA servers and cache any partials belonging to the
chosen CAs. These partials could be obtained when the client receives CREPs by request
or overhears them due to requests issued by other clients. O f course, a client will apply
some cache replacement policy once it gets a candidate partial and its memory is full.
Finally, one drawback of Cache-Focus is that filling the cache will take longer
with the CACMAN nodes because not every overheard or received partial is allowed to
be cached; however, a slight enhancement could relax the problem by allowing partials
which are not members of the focus group to be cached if the memory at the client
permits, but those partials will have the highest chance o f being victims if another
candidate share arrives.
4.5.4

Explicit CREQ

The purpose of this enhancement is to eliminate duplicate partial replies if the requester
already has those partials. For example, if the requester already has 13 partial certificates

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

45

out o f 15 for a given subject, then the client is interested in acquiring any two partials that
it does not have. There is no value o f getting the same partials again, especially when
they affect the bandwidth and energy, and consume valuable CPU time. One way of
implementing this enhancement is to add bitmap fields in the CREQ header, in which
each bit represents a server ID; the requester will set the bits that correspond to the
partials it has for the certificate in question. Now, when a CACMAN node receives a
CREQ, it can decide whether its cache will benefit the requester or not.

4.6.

CRL in CACMAN

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has requested that the
MITRE Corporation study the cost o f implementing and deploying PKI for the federal
government [51]. The conclusion shows that Certificate Revocation List (CRL) is
considered as the most expensive component of PKI framework. In MANET, the
situation is more challenging due to its inherent properties. In this section, we will
analyze the consequences of integrating various CRL schemes into CACMAN without
favoring any specific scheme since this needs more detailed assumptions.
Let us first start with the simplest solution, that is, a system with short-lived
certificates only. Such systems will require CA servers to be always online and no CRL
needs to be issued. The consequence o f this model is that it will destroy the temporal
locality and, hence, will make caching useless especially in applications that require real
time certification10. However, this is an extreme side o f the situation, and many
applications and transactions have less strenuous requirements for certificate freshness.
For example, CACMAN could be deployed in an environment that accepts a validity
period of, say, a couple o f days or weeks without CRL.

10 When the client and server clocks are not synchronized, an accuracy o f 15 seconds is de facto real
time. Evermore, most financial applications trust 4-hour old signatures [49].
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Now, let us consider a more challenging environment that requires both types of
certificates11 (i.e. short and long-lived). In this environment, CRL is needed and
CACMAN should distinguish between both types of certificates and allow CACMAN
clients to cache long-lived certificates besides handling CRL distribution efficiently.
If we apply OCSP [41], RCA [52], or NOVOMODO [49], we introduce another
server to answer queries about revocation status which means a single point of failure has
been added to the system. Replicating OCSP will expose the system more and make it
more complicated. Another alternative design is to make status checking done by
CACMAN CAs themselves. In this case, we utilize the security investment (i.e. threshold
based protocol); however, we increase the burden on CA servers and imagine how every
queried CA will try to collect at least t agreements to sign replies and this is exactly what
we are trying to avoid.
Now, let us consider the fundamental CRL method in which every list contains a
field telling when the next issue will be. Since this information is signed by CAs and
publicly available, there is no harm in duplicating them to some other nodes by flooding
and hoping the list will be delivered to all nodes or by selecting some strategic nodes
which could volunteer to carry this burden. The problem arises when a given node missed
an update (i.e. the "next update" time elapsed), in this case, if the client does not receive
the CRL in the expected time frame, then it should consider its cache as suspicious and
purge it. A possible enhancement is to mark the cached partials as dirty without using
them, hoping the list would be obtained when the network is connected again by
retrieving the missing update from any neighbor or querying any CACMAN server. Delta
CRL will have similar situation but with the more challenging problem of probably
seeking more than one missing CRL update12, and it has the advantage o f having compact
size.

11 For example, short-lived certificates are issued for single onetime login tickets and long-lived ones
are issued for authorizing financial transactions that are less than a given amount.
12 Remember Delta CRL is issued incrementally and the verifier should obtain all issued lists.
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Yet another method is to issue counter certificate as implemented in URSA
(Section 3.3). The advantage o f this method is that it does not put any timing
requirements in revoking certificates (i.e. revoke on demand). One problem is to make
sure that a counter certificate is propagated to all legitimate nodes. A simple solution,
though not bullet proof, is to flood the network whenever a counter certificate is issued.
To make the solution even better, every counter certificate issued by the CA should
contain an auto increment number. The purpose of that number is to allow any
CACMAN client to determine whether it has missed any counter certificate issuance or
not. However, this is possible if we assume that any given node is surrounded by one or
more legitimate nodes. The client will send, say, a local broadcast message showing the
last counter certificate which it has received, and legitimate nodes will tell if the last
counter certificate heard by the requester is indeed the latest one.
CACMAN framework has no problem adapting the CRL methods mentioned
above, and there are no security threats o f caching CRL since it is public information
signed by CA servers. The answer to the question "Which CRL method is suitable for
MANET?" seems to be application dependant. We think integrating Delta CRL into CA
servers is reasonable for most applications while others that need more freshness may
request the CA directly.

4.7.

Other Issues Associated with the Framework

4.7.1

Key Refreshing between CAs

Key refreshing is an important operation done by CA servers to protect against malicious
attackers from learning the secret over a long period. CACMAN nodes do not interfere
with that operation. However, there is a problem after refreshing CAs partial-keys: any
issued partial certificates are no longer compatible with the shares residing in CACMAN
client caches. We emphasize that this incompatibility does not mean those partials cached
in CACMAN nodes are obsolete. They are still valid but not compatible with any feature
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issued partials13. However, a node should somehow have the means to distinguish
between old and new shares. One possible way is to make CREPs contain a number that
tells in which epoch this partial has been signed. To reduce the overhead of
housekeeping, CACMAN node should delete shares belongs to old epoch.
4.7.2

Partial Certificates Compaction and Redundancy Removal

The purpose of this operation, as the name suggests, is to remove redundant shares
carried by clients. This process reduces the storage needed to carry certificates since a
partially signed certificate is as large as a complete one. Additionally, it saves some
bandwidth because a single complete certificate may travel instead o f several partial
ones, particularly when the threshold is relatively high.
The procedure could be executed periodically14, and each CACMAN node locally
broadcasts a list that contains the missing parts needed to complete its collection; then,
surrounding CACMANs will send back missing parts, if available, to the client for
reconstruction.
It is possible that some partials will not be combined because they have been
originated from a compromised CA or modified by a malicious CACMAN. But as we
have mentioned in Section 2.5, detection schemes without exhaustive search will be used
to figure out and delete wrong partials.
4.7.3

Distribution o f Partially Cached Certificates

One important issue is how to distribute full or partial certificates coherently in the
system to reduce the possibility of having the same full or partial certificates residing in
adjacent neighbors. We suggest some techniques on how every node decides whether it
caches an overheard certificate(s) or hopes that other node(s) do it. Such a decision will

13 Remember that key refreshing does not change the private-key o f the service. Otherwise, every node
should be informed by such change and this will reduce the usefulness o f the service.
14 It is not necessary that all CACMAN nodes execute the procedure at the same time. Every CACMAN
node can decide individually when the next execution to refresh its repository will occur.
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affect two things. First, it will affect the possibility for a CACMAN client to find that
certificate in the future. Second, it will affect the chance for that client to offer that
certificate to other CACMAN clients.
Here, we show some possible techniques on how coherent distribution is possible:
1) All on the Path Cache: This is the simplest method, when a CREP message
travels through its path, every client in that path will cache the partially signed
certificate contained in that reply.
2) All Can Hear Cache: In this method, every node that receives a CREP,
including nodes that reside in the radio range of the node that forwarded the
CREP, will cache the partial certificate. This method will make nodes have
similar caches especially in low mobility scenarios. However, in high
mobility, and more specifically when each node goes to unrelated directions,
this and "All on the Path Cache" can be useful to make an even distribution o f
the certificates or partials.
3) Path Flip-flop Cache: In this case, a node residing in the CREP path inspects
the header; if the node order is odd, then it will cache that CREP, including
the recipient. This heuristic tries to discriminate certificate distribution
because it makes no sense for two adjacent nodes to have almost the same
contents. The advantage of this technique is more noticeable in low-mobility
scenarios. However, it is not possible for some routing protocols (e.g. AODV)
to know if a given node is even or not in a given message path. In that case, a
user-defined Boolean field in the CREP header could be used to implement
this heuristic by flipping its value in every node the CREP visits and cache
only iff the field is set.
4) Probabilistic Cache: every node receiving a CREP will cache it based on a
predefined probability. This probably should be chosen based on network
density (e.g. low probability in dense networks and high probability in low
density networks).
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Fig. 8 illustrates these alternatives. The "S" node denotes a CACMAN that sent a
CREP or a client node that received a CREQ and it has the certificate in question in its
local cache. The "R" node denotes the request issuer. Nodes labeled "C" denote clients
that will cache that particular CREP and empty nodes are those that will take no action.
The arrows denote the CREP path and the gray lines denote the connectivity (e.g. in the
radio range o f the connected node).

S

S
(c)

(d )

Fig. 8. Cache Heuristics (a) All on the Path Cache (b) All Can Hear Cache (c) Path Flip-flop Cache (d)
Probabilistic Cache.
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4.7.4

Cache Replacement Policy

When a CACMAN node wants to cache a certificate and it happens that its cache is full,
several classic policies could be used to choose the victim, such as LRU or FIFO.
Additionally, other possible criteria are based on the completeness of the victim
certificate and could be combined to previously mentioned techniques. There are
additional possibilities on how to choose the victim:
1) The victim could be the new partial itself since the caching CACMAN client
has a complete certificate making the former redundant.
2) The victim partial would be the one corresponding to a certificate that has the
minimum number of shares at that client.
3) If the received reply is a complete certificate, the decision is easier; the victim
would be those partials that correspond to the complete certificate. If none
exist, option 2) could be applied.

4.8.

Deployment Scenarios in Hybrid MANET

MANET usually has been seen as an isolated network that does not have a connection to
the outside world. This is acceptable in some context and scenarios, but a more generic
model is possible, "hybrid MANET." This is a topology that integrates a MANET with a
gateway connected to the Internet.
We think o f two possible scenarios for deploying CACMAN CA servers in such
environments as those illustrated in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10. Both configurations share the
following components: a MANET infrastructure connected to an access point which is
connected to a fixed infrastructure via a satellite link. The fixed infrastructure in turn is
connected, through routers, to a higher level CA server residing on the Internet which
may cover other networks. The principal difference between the two configurations is
where to deploy CACMAN CA servers. Deploying CACMAN CAs outside the MANET,
as in Fig. 9 , will eliminate CA exposure to wireless threats (i.e. more security).
Moreover, if we allow some CA to acts as delegates - similar to COCA- a CACMAN
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client will be required to contact one CA server to get a complete certificate which
eliminates the overhead of caching partials while still caching full certificate. The
disadvantage of this design is that the gateway will be a bottleneck on the system, and the
inherent propagation delay o f satellite connection will reduce response time.
Additionally, it will be a single point o f failure, and if compromised, CA service in the
MANET will be denied.

- -(<?»

F ix e d N e tw o rk

M ANET

CA

CA
CA
CA

In te rn e t

H ig h e r le v el (

CA

Fig. 9. CACMAN CA servers outside MANET domain.

On the other hand, deploying CA services within MANET will eliminate the
frequent access to the access point except when communicating with the higher level CA,
which is rarely required, in addition to a fast response time. Deploying CA inside the
MANET will require more care regarding CA security since they will be more exposed
and probably require a higher threshold for the system, as compared to the former design,
to ensure security.
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Fig. 10. CACMAN CA servers inside MANET domain.

4.9.

Conclusion and Summary

We began this section by showing our motivation to develop CACMAN. We followed by
listing the framework assumptions. A detailed description o f the basic protocol was given
followed by surveying possible communication techniques. Details about various
enhancements to our framework were given followed by a discussion on the impact of
some CRL schemes on CACMAN. Then we examined other miscellaneous issues such as
removing redundancy partials and alterative ways to spread partially cached certificates.
Finally, deployment scenarios for hybrid-MANET were discussed. In the next section, we
will evaluate CACMAN from performance perspective and show how it reacts to various
enhancements.
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SECTION 5
SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we put CACMAN to the test. We have implemented and simulated the
basic protocol and its variations and enhancements mentioned in Sections 4.3 and 4.5.
The purpose o f doing this simulation is twofold. First, it provides us a basis for putting
CACMAN and related work side by side to get a more objective comparison. Second, it
allows us to see how the protocol parameters might behave in practice, hence, allowing
us to check their significance to the framework.
At the preliminary stage o f this work, we have evaluated CACMAN-Basic using a
Monte Carlo simulation that we developed [1]. At that time, this was sufficient to provide
us with the preliminary results to continue in this direction, but it was not sufficient to
draw a faithful conclusion that could be used to compare it with related work. This is
because it is not as realistic as the NS-2 [47], and besides, it does not consider mobility
and other parameters. Here, we will show CACMAN simulation results obtained from
NS-2 which eliminates the necessity o f presenting the outcomes obtained from the Monte
Carlo simulation. Additionally, we will restrict our comparison to M OCA protocol for the
same reasons as shown in 4.1.
This section is organized as follows: Section 5.1 highlights some details about the
simulation environment. Section 5.2 lists the simulation assumptions. The results and
discussion are shown in Sections 5.3 and Section 5.4. Section 5.5 is our concluding
remarks.
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5.1.

Simulation Description

In our simulations, we used the most recent build of NS-215 to simulate the following
scenario similar to the one used in MOCA [70], The goal o f this choice, as mentioned
before, is to achieve a fair comparison between the two protocols. Furthermore, we
replicated the Flooding scenario described in [70] and [71] to make sure that we have
almost identical settings, and it turned out that the differences are negligible.
The scenario used for our simulation follows: 150 mobile nodes were scattered in
a 1000 m2 field, 30 of which are CA servers to the remaining 120 client's nodes. All
nodes are moving using the CMU random waypoint model [15]. One hundred nodes will
make 10 CREQs during the 600 second simulation time. We have generated nodes
mobility scenarios for maximum speeds of 0, 1, 5, 10, and 20 m/sec with pause times o f 0
and 10 seconds. Each configuration is replicated at least three times16 to ensure the
accuracy of the results. In the original paper [70], a network o f 300 nodes including 50
servers, has been simulated too, but the paper did not show the results due to the
similarity to 150 node case. In addition, we used caches capable o f holding 75, 150, 225,
and 300 shares, and we tested thresholds of 5, 15, 20, and 25. We have used a single
cache replacement policy in which it is applied when a CREP arrives and there is no
room in the client's local cache. The policy is to delete a share that corresponds to the
certificate which has the minimum shares at that client.
For convenience, the simulation settings for the most frequently referenced
parameters are summarized in Table II.

15 A short overview o f NS-2 can be found in Appendix A .
16 In our case, replicating the experiment more than three times did not show any significant differences
in the results.
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T a b l e II
S im u l a t io n p a r a m e t e r s u s e d i n im p l e m e n t in g CACMAN

Certificate
reply policy

Parameter
Grid size
Maximum speed
Pause time
Simulation time
Total number of nodes
Number o f MOCA servers
Threshold ( t )
Cache sizes
Routing protocol
Mobility model
Total number of requests
Cache replacement policy for
CACMAN
CACMAN-Basic

Value
I
1000 m2
1,10, and 20 meters/second
0 and 10 seconds
600 seconds
150
30
5,15,25
75, 150, and 225
AODV
Random waypoint
1000
Certificate with minimum number of shares
will be deleted.
If a full certificate exists, then send it.
1
Otherwise, send one share selected
randomly.

CACMAN-X replies

If a full certificate exists, then send it.
Otherwise, send X shares selected randomly
if available.

CACMAN-No delay

On cache hit, share(s) are sent immediately.

CACMAN-Lazy replies

One cache hit, shares(s) are scheduled to be
sent on delay periods between (0 and X)
where X=T0ms, 40ms, 160ms, or 640ms.

CACMAN-Lazy replies with
cancellation option

Similar to CACMAN-Lazy replies but the
requester will send cancel message if it has
already got sufficient replies.

o
<1> 13
•5
U
03 60

CACMAN - Shuffled

The cache is filled randomly up to its
capacity.

o
U

CACMAN-Focused

The cache is filled by shares that belong to
its focus group G where |G| = [1..30],

GO

|
"E*
ei

S3

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

57

5.2.

Simulation Assumptions

Here we list our simulation assumptions that govern our results and all interpretations
should consider such assumptions.
1) There are many other parameters in the simulation which can be modified,
such as antenna type, propagation model, transmission range, MAC layer
buffer size, and packet size, etc. We used the default settings provided by the
simulator.
2) There are no assumptions on the processing time, and it takes a constant time
to do computing operations.
3) The simulation covers the normal scenario and does not consider any threat
model or anomaly behaviors done by clients or servers nodes. It is understood
that such behavior will have some impact, and we will cover this point in
more detail in Section 6.
4) Even if the requester demands a certificate from a principal which resides one
hop away, the requester (client) will make a local broadcast regardless o f
target principal (i.e. node) location.
5) Maintenance and security parts o f the protocol such as CRL dissemination or
CA Key-refreshing are not implemented because they are out o f the scope of
what we are measuring.
6) Random waypoint has a recently discovered problem which is described in
detail in [69], but we are still using the old method for comparison with
MOCA. However, the impact o f using the modified Random waypoint model
is not significant unless the total simulation time is very long, above 700 sec,
and routing information is involved extensively, and this is not the case in our
simulation.
7) Whenever a client receives duplicate partials, they are counted once.
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8) In the case of a client receiving a full certificate, it will be counted as if the
client has received shares [ l . i ] . The impact of this assumption is that when the
client receives further redundant shares which belong to [l..f], they will not be
counted as mentioned above.
9) There are many variations and values each parameter can take. Our goal is to
see the impact on reasonably selected values. Hence, pushing every parameter
to its extreme value is not one o f our goals. Thus, it is misleading to draw a
generalized conclusion about the system with parameters that are far away
from what we have used in this section.
10) Certificates are distributed uniformly into CACMAN clients; however, other
distributions could enhance CACMAN performance.

5.3.

Results and Discussion

In this section, we will analyze the results for every major configuration and the impact
of changing the parameters that we care about. We will start by comparing CACMANBasic with MOCA.
5.3.1

MOCA and Flooding

Let us first discuss MOCA simulation results obtained from [70]. Fig. 11(a) shows the
results of implementing the certification protocol using the pure flooding method [71],
The X axis represents the number o f received distinct CREPs, and their corresponding
frequency is shown at the Y axis. For example, in the case o f running the flooding
protocol when the maximum speed is 10 m/s with a pause time o f zero, about 50 requests
received 25 unique CERPs, and about one or two requests did not get any replies at all.
Indeed, flooding is effective; however, it injects a large number o f control packets into
the network (e.g. imagine if threshold is set to 10 or less). Fig. 11(b) shows the effect of
introducing the MOCA protocol. The impact is already reflected as a reduction on the
frequency scale as compared to Flooding protocol. The peaks around different[5's are
caused by MOCA when it uses cached route information to send unicast requests to
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MOCA servers, thus eliminating unnecessary flooding of the network. As we can see, the
occurrences are still shifted to the right, which indicates a high rate o f success, but many
redundant replies are also received due to the fact that MOCA floods the network if no
sufficient routes to the CA servers exist in the client routing cache table.
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Fig. 11. (a) Flooding based certification protocol, (b) MOCA certification protocol on average speed =
lOm/s and 0 pause time.
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5.3.2

CA CMAN-Basic and CA CMAN-X-Replies17

Fig. 12, Fig. 13, and Fig. 14 show the basic CACMAN protocol when the threshold is set
to 5, 15, and 25 respectively. Each of those figures show the effect of mobility and cache
size. The legends in these figures give the representations o f "number o f nodes-pause
time-max speed (cache capacity) protocol." In Fig. 12, where t - 5 , few requests
received insufficient replies, and the majority received an overwhelming number of
replies. When we increased the threshold to 15, as in Fig. 13, the number o f requests
which got insufficient replies increased, and the cache size played a more important role.
Notice that when the cache capacity increases to 150 and 225, as in Fig. 13 (b and c)
respectively, the situation is much better as the number of unsuccessful requests
decreases (remember that a request that receives fewer replies than the threshold is
considered unsuccessful).
When the threshold is set to 25, the protocol performed badly regardless o f the
cache size and rarely gets more than a few successful requests out o f 1000 requests sent
at the simulation time.
From the figures above, we can draw some general conclusions about the
performance of CACMAN-Basic with respect to threshold, cache capacity, and mobility:
1) The effect of mobility is not that significant regardless o f the capacity and
threshold and this is true even when other enhancements are used; therefore,
we will usually show the results o f mobility scenarios of maximum speed o f
lOm/s and 0 second pause time.
2) We have observed that, when t = 5 , the cache size of 75 is sufficient, and
there is no noticeable benefit when we increase it.

17 The reason that we have distinguished the CACMAN-Basic protocol, which could be seen as 'XReplies' with X = l, is that we consider the basic protocol as the reference point for many enhancements and
comparisons.
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Fig. 12. (t=5). (a-c) Mobility effect with different cache sizes, (d) Cache capacity effect.

3) When t = 25, CACMAN-Basic is not capable of satisfactory performance,
and the maximum cache size we used was not enough to get significant
results.
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Fig. 12. Continued.

4) At t = 15, CACMAN-Basic performance, as expected, was between t = 5 and
t = 25. Thus, it seems that gained performance is worth the increase in cache
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size, particularity when it increases from 75 to 150 shares. Finally, the peaks
around the thresholds (very noticeable around t = 5 , less at t = 15 , and none
at / = 25 ) are due to local cache hits. In that case, no request will be sent to
the network and this is why the frequency at corresponding t is low,
specifically when t -1 5 or 25.
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Fig. 13. (<=15). (a-c) Mobility effect with different cache sizes, (d) Cache capacity effect.
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Fig. 13. Continued.
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Fig. 14. (t=25). (a-c) Mobility effect with different cache sizes, (d) Cache capacity effect.
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Fig. 14 Continued.
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Fig. 15. The effect o f applying X-replies optimization, (a) sizes 75 and 150 (b) size 225. r=15.

Now, let us examine the performance gained when we use CACMAN-X-Replies
variation. Fig. 15 and Fig. 16 show the impact o f increasing the number o f replies when
a CACMAN client receives a request that has more than one partial in the cache. As the
size of the cache gets bigger and the number o f allowed replies increases, more
successful requests are getting through. Indeed, CACMAN-X-Replies are very useful
even when t = 25 as shown in Fig. 15. This tells us that the needed partial probably is not
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the first one found in the clients' cache, and the more we increase the number of replies,
the higher hit ratio we will obtain.
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Fig. 16. The effect o f applying X-replies optimization, (a) sizes 75 and 150. (b) size 225. t=25.
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S.3.3

Comparing Flooding, MOCA, CACMAN-Basic, and CACMAN-X-Replies

Figures shown in Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2, gives us a good visualization o f how the
numbers of CREPs are distributed and also gives an indication of the impact of a given
parameter. However, it is difficult to get quantitative measures to answer questions like
"How much performance do we gain if we change that parameter?" To answer these
types o f questions, we need to have comparison criteria such that we can see which
configuration is better in a given comparison factor. However, we will use the above
mentioned way of plotting results accompanied with a supporting numerical value to get
a more accurate picture. The performance criteria that we use in this dissertation are the
following:
1) Packet Overhead: This is a very commonly used criteria to compare
networking protocols, and it is interpreted in this context as the sum o f data
and control packets injected in a given simulation run.
2) Success Ratio: In this context, this is defined as the number o f successful
requests (ones that received at least t replies) over the total number of
requests injected during the simulation time.
3) Overhead per Successful Request: This is defined as the ratio of packet
overhead to the number o f successful requests. In other words, on average,
what is the packet overhead to send a successful request?
4) Adjusted Overhead p er Request to Guarantee 100% Success Ratio: This
measures the cost per request to guarantee 100% reliability o f the system.
Detailed discussion o f this criterion will be shown at the end o f this section.
In general, to make these measurements useful, compared systems should receive
identical or similar workload, and as expected, a system with fewer packets overhead
performs better. However, guaranteeing similar workload is not sufficient to draw a final
conclusion because of the existence o f important factors (i.e. success ratio). To clarify
this point, consider system X with packet overhead o f 1000 and success ratio o f 90% and
system Y with packet overhead o f 100 and success ratio o f 70%. As we can see, it is
difficult to judge which system is better if we are considering both factors. To overcome
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the above dilemma, either we compare the systems by one factor at a time, using a
formula that covers the measurements of interest, or we agree on a common averaging
formula and assign some weights to each factor 18. In this thesis, we will use the first two
measures since the third one is subjective. In this section, we will evaluate the systems by
showing the packet overhead o f the tested configurations and their success ratio. The
third and forth measurements will be shown at the end of this section.

T a b l e III
P a c k e t o v e r h e a d f o r s o m e s e l e c t e d c o n f ig u r a t io n s

Flooding
MOCA Closest unicast jB = 5

Average number
o f packets
197601
137666

MOCA Closest unicast /? = 10

159039

80.5%

MOCA Closest unicast /3 = 15

170375

86.2%

MOCA Closest unicast = 20
MOCA Closest unicast ft = 25

177364
187063
16516
14028
19121
22757
21911
25564
33569
27838
39448
28429
40199
28992
40329
51581

89.8%
94.7%
8.4%
7.1%
9.7%
11.5%
11.1%
12.9%
17.0%
14.1%
20.0%
14.4%
20.3%
14.7%
20.4%
26.1%

M odel

CACMAN basic,75 cache, t = 5
CACMAN basic,75 cache, t = 15
CACMAN basic, 150 cache, t = 15
CACMAN basic,225 cache, t = 15
CACMAN basic,225 cache, t = 25
CACMAN 2-reps, 150 cache, t = 15
CACMAN 2-reps,225 cache, t = 15
CACMAN 4-reps, 150 cache, t = 15
CACMAN 4-reps,225 cache, t = 15
CACMAN 8-reps, 150 cache, t = 15
CACMAN 8-reps,225 cache, t = 15
CACMAN all-reps, 150 cache, t = 15
CACMAN all-reps,225 cache, t = 15
CACMAN all-reps,300 cache, t = 15

Ratio to flooding
100%
69.7%

18 The problem o f evaluation systems performance has been discussed in depth in [38].
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Table III shows the ratio of various protocols' packet overhead to flooding
overhead, and for example, MOCA saves about 30% when /3 = 5 compared to flooding,
while CACMAN saves 92% compared to flooding when t = 5 (Remember j3 = a + 1, but
we assume a = 0 to simplify the comparison. However, the reader can vary a , and, for
example, can compare MOCA with /? = 10 to CACMAN with t = 5 by setting a - 5 ).
Furthermore, the overhead is also affected proportionally, in the case o f CACMAN, by
the cache size and the number of replies. CACMAN has a very low overhead compared
to both MOCA and pure flooding because CACMAN never allows a request to propagate
more than one hop.
If we switch the focus to the success ratio as a measure o f performance, Fig. 17
shows the success ratio for various scenarios19. We used the same technique used in [70]
to plot the CACMAN-Basic and CACMAN-X-Replies success ratios. The figures
represent the fraction of successfully arrived CREPs as function o f time. According to
these figures, flooding is indeed the most effective way to obtain a high success ratio, but
at the price of higher packet overhead. CACMAN-Basic performs better, 92% to 99%
depending on cache size, compared to MOCA, 91%, when t - 5 . The cache size has a
noticeable effect in CACMAN-Basic, when t - 15, (the success ratio was 30%, 60%, and
70% for cache sizes 75, 150, and 225, respectively), but this is not close, as expected, to
Flooding (95% at ? = 15) but close to MOCA (77% at t = 15). However, the use o f Xreplies optimization tightens the gap between cache sizes and gives better results (8replies with size cache size of 150 achieved 90% success ratio) compared to MOCA,
which is close to Flooding.
These figures show some other important results. For example, observing the
difference in time scale, CACMAN stabilizes (stops increasing) much faster than
flooding and MOCA by as much as 16 times (e.g. CACMAN-Basic t5(75) in Fig. 17(c)
stabilizes in 0.03 sec as compared to Flooding, in Fig. 17(a), where t= 5 which stabilizes

19 The threshold t is denoted by k in [67].
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at 0.5sec). Such high performance is due to the fact that some partials are available at the
local cache of the requester. Besides CACMAN initial requests never propagate more
than one hop. Moreover, CACMAN receives CREPs much faster than MOCA and
Flooding, which is another benefit of CACMAN. The previous figure is useful to choose
the appropriate timeout value when a CREQ is sent. For example, for CACMAN-Basic
with t = 5 , a reasonable timeout is 0.06 sec and 0.08 sec when t - 15.
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Fig. 17. Success Ratio with (a) Flooding, (b) MOCA Closest-Unicast, (c) CACMAN-Basic, (d) CACMAN
X-replies.
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Fig. 17. Continued.

Finally, we would like conclude this analysis by summarizing the success ratio of
all the parameters of interest for CACMAN-Basic and CACMAN-X-Replies as shown in
Fig. 18. It is clear that the size increase (from 75 to 300) o f the cache and the number of
replies (from 2 to all found partials) can boost the success ratio specifically when t is
high (e.g. 25).
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100%

All-Reps

75

150 225 300 75
T5

95.6 98.6 99.2

150 225 300 75
T 5

37.7 63.3 73.9

150 225 300
t :15

0.1% 1.7% 5.7%

■ Basic

96.3 98.7 99.4

45.2 74.1 84.6

0.1% 7.7% 25.9

■ 2-Reps

99.0 99.2

79.1 88.3

11.4 38.6

□ 4-Reps

99.0 99.2

79.0 88.5

14.2 39.8

□ 8-Reps

99.0 99.2 99.5

78.9 89.0 92.6

26.0 46.7 62.3 ■ All-Reps

Fig. 18. Success ratio for various scenarios (Max speed = lOm/sec, Pause time=0). Empty boxes mean the
results has not been reported

5.3.4

The Effect o f Removing CA Servers on CA CMAN Performance

This section is to simulate the performance of CACMAN when some CA servers are
down because of a sudden crash or a maintenance necessity. The aim o f such a simulation
is to see how the quality o f the service (i.e. success ratio) is affected by the loss o f some
CA servers. We simulated this behavior by randomly choosing some CAs and turning
them off for the entire simulation period.
Fig. 19 shows the impact o f losing 10 and 20 CAs ( t - 1 5 ), a loss o f one third and
two thirds of the total number o f CAs respectively as compared to when all CAs are
functioning. We used CACMAN-Basic and CACMAN-All-Replies clients with different
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cache sizes to see the tolerance of different configurations to such losses. The figures
show, clearly, that a large cache size or the use of All-Reps variance plays a major role in
making the service transparent (Fig. 19(e)). We mapped Fig. 19 to Table IV and Table V
for a clearer analysis.

T a b l e IV
S u c c e s s r a t io w h e n s o m e C A s e r v e r s c r a s h (C A C M A N -B A S IC )

# CAs
30 (default)
20
10

150 cache
63.3%
51.3%
40.0%

225 cache
73.9%
65.8%
60.7%

Table V
S u c c e s s r a t io w h e n s o m e C A s e r v e r s c r a s h (C A C M A N -A l l -R e p l i e s )

#CAs
30 (default)
20
10

150 cache
78.9%
74.4%
68.9%

225 cache
89.0%
86.2%
84.5%

120
150-0-10 (75) basic
150-0-10 (75) 20 MOCAs
150-0-10 75 10 MOCAs

100
CA

O
O
c
2
3O
o
O
(a)

80
60
40

20
0
0

5

10

15

20

25

30

No. of CREPs Received

Fig. 19. Visualization o f the impact o f CA crashes.(a) CACMAN-Basic with cache size 75, (b) with cache
size 150, (c) with cache size 225. (d) CACMAN-All-Replies with cache size 150, (e) cache size 225. All
with /=15 and max speed o f 10 m/sec.
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Fig. 19. Continued.
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Fig. 19. Continued.

5.3.5

Cache-Focus Optimization

In Section 4.5.3, we described the rationale behind Cache-Focus (CF) optimization. Here,
we will show the impact of implementing Cache-Focus into the protocol performance.
We have applied this enhancement on CACMAN-Basic and CACMAN-All-Reps with
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the values o f 1, 2, 4, and 8. This means in each simulation run, every client will focus on
caching partials issued by one CA (i.e. CF=1), any two CAs (i.e. CF=2), and so on.
The results show an initial improvement when CF=1, but it starts to be less
effective as CF increases, and when CF=8, the hit ratio is almost equal to CACMANBasic as shown in Table VI. The reason why a small CF value is beneficial is because it
increases the chances of finding a partial for the target by allowing only shares that
belong to the chosen CF to be exist at any client. For example, in the case when the cache
size is 150, a partial is always found (remember we have a total o f 150 participants), and
the hope now is to find t neighbors with different cache-focus choices to guarantee
distinct replies. On the other hand, CACMAN-All-Reps eliminates the benefits o f this
optimization by sending many replies and hoping that some of them will match the
needed request as shown in Table VII.
Table VI
C a c h e - f o c u s f o r C A C M A N -B a s ic

Protocol
1Basic
1 CF
2 CF
4 CF
8 CF

75 cache
37.7%
55.3%
53.5%
53.5%
34.3%

150 cache
63.3%
83.1%
82.3%
81.9%
59.6%

T a b l e V II
C a c h e - f o c u s f o r C A C M A N -A l l -R e p s

I Protocol
1All reps
1 CF
2 CF
4 CF
8 CF

5.3.6

75 cache
51.1%
55.0%
53.1%
51.7%
47.4%

150 cache
78.9%
80.0%
81.2%
77.7%
77.9%

Lazy-Replies with Cancellation

In Section 4.5.2, we mentioned that the goal of the lazy replies technique is to reduce the
amount of dropped packets due to the packet-storm-effect (i.e. packets arrive to a single
node from many sources at the same time). We implemented this enhancement by
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delaying CREPs by 10, 40, 160, 640 milliseconds. The simulation shows that there is no
significant gain in the performance because the CACMAN's low packet overhead reduces
the impact from such situation. However, even if CACMAN has immunity from the
packet-storm-effect, as compared to MOCA and Flooding, there is still a good reason to
implement the other variation, i.e. Lazy-Replies with Cancellation, to reduce the amount
of redundant replies by allowing the client to send a "Cancel" message once it has the
sufficient number of CREPs. Fig. 20 illustrates the effect of implementing various delay
values. The goal of this enhancement is to group the number o f CREPs as close as
possible to the threshold. This will not affect the success ratio, but it positively reduces
the unnecessary CREPs. Fig. 20(a) suggests that there is no significant difference
between a 10 and 40ms delay; however, lengthening the interval to 160 and 640
milliseconds pushes the number of replies close to the threshold (here, 7 = 15) . The
figure also suggests that there is no significant difference, again, between 160 and 640 ms
delay. However, CACMAN-All-Reps, Fig. 20(b), shows the same results when 10 and
40ms values are examined despite a noticeable gap between 160 and 640 ms delay.
Remember that the cancellation message will not be sent until the client which has sent
the CREQ gets sufficient CREPs. In the case o f CACMAN-All-Reps, if a CACMAN
client has more than one CREP, each one will be scheduled for transmission, and a
cancellation message will purge CREPs which have not been sent yet. This explains why
CACMAN-All-Reps benefited more from this enhancement as compared to CACMANBasic.
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Fig. 20. Visualization o f different delay values (t=15) (a) CACMAN-Basic (b) CACMAN-All-Reps.

Fig. 21 shows the packet overhead for both scenarios. For example, in the case of
CACMAN-All-Reps with lazy reply interval 640 ms, there was 55% less packet overhead
compared to 10 ms delay.
Finally, we should mention that the amount of reduction o f packet overhead is
also a function of the threshold. Intuitively, when t = 25, there is a little reduction since
the amount o f redundancy is less compared to t = 5 .
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Fig. 21. Packet overhead for different maximum-delay values (normalized to 10ms delay).

5.4.

Single Measure

In all of our previous discussions, measurements o f Flooding, MOCA, and CACMAN
performance were based primarily on the success ratio and packet overhead. We have
shown that it is desirable to increase the former and decrease the latter. We will conclude
this section by showing that both factors can be merged to a single one as described in
Section 5.3.3. Table VIII lists packet overhead per successful request and the adjusted
packet overhead to guarantee the 100% success ratio for a request assuming a client will
use flooding if the first attempt was not successful. That single measurement is calculated
by the following formula:
AO = (hit ratio x POSR) + ((1- hit ratio) *FOR)
AO stands for "Adjusted Overhead to ensure 100% reliability" and POSR is "Packet
Overhead per Successful Request" and FOR is "Flooding overhead/request."
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T a b l e VIII
POSR AND AO VALUES FOR VARIOUS CONFIGURATIONS

Protocol
Flooding
MOCA (7 = 15)
CACMAN-Basic t = 1 5 , cache size 75
CACMAN-Basic 1 = 15, cache size 150
CACMAN-Basic t = 15, cache size 150, Lazy 40ms
CACMAN-Basic t = 15, cache size 150, Lazy 640ms
CACMAN-Basic t = 15, cache size 150, 1 FC
CACMAN-Basic t = 15, cache size 150, 2 FC
CACMAN-Basic t = 15, cache size 150, 4 FC
CACMAN-Basic 1 = 15, cache size 225
CACMAN-2 Reps t = 15, cache size 150
CACMAN-2 Reps t = 15, cache size 225
CACM AN-4 Reps 1 = 15, cache size 150
CACMAN-4 Reps t = 15, cache size 225
CACMAN-8 Reps 1 = 15, cache size 150
CACMAN-8 Reps t = 15, cache size 225
CACMAN-A11 Reps t = 15, cache size 150
CACMAN-All-Reps t =15 , cache size 150, Lazy 40ms
CACMAN-All-Reps t - 15, cache size 150, Lazy 640ms
CACMAN-All-Reps t = 15, cache size 150, 1 FC
CACMAN-All-Reps 1 = 15, cache size 150, 2 FC
CACMAN-All-Reps 1 = 15, cache size 150, 4 FC
CACMAN-A11 Reps t - 15, cache size 225

POSR
199.597
218.430
37.210
30.207
30.538
21.486
40.764
41.015
41.340
30.794
34.499
39.680
35.193
44.675
35.941
45.423
36.745
44.145
20.372
41.542
41.665
43.061
45.313

AO
199.597
214.290
138.380
92.373
74.662
63.698
67.607
69.084
69.984
74.859
77.260
64.307
69.554
62.801
70.145
63.153
71.107
61.711
35.427
73.153
71.356
79.065
62.285

Flooding and MOCA have the highest packet overhead per successful request.
CACMAN with lazy replies of 640ms has the least in both variations as shown in Table
VIII.

5.5.

Concluding Remarks

From the previous discussion, we summarize our simulation results into the following
points:
1) The effect of the threshold is noticeable, and the more it increases, the less the
likelihood of getting all partials from the first attempt.
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2) The number of replies received per request is still larger than required except
when t = 25, in which case the number o f successful replies is reduced
dramatically. However, when we applied the X-replies variation, the number
of successful CREPs increased noticeably.
3) The mobility effect is not that significant since CACMAN utilizes local
broadcasts, and mobility will have a significant effect when routing
information is involved in the protocol.
4) Cache size obviously has an impact on performance. However, going from a
cache size of 75 to 150 is more significant and effective than going from 150
to 225, and this is consistent in other thresholds and max speeds, which
suggests 150 as the best compromise between cache size and hit ratio.
5) Techniques like Cache-Focus and Lazy Replies with Cancellation can
increase the performance o f CACMAN without noticeable increase in
overhead.
6) CACMAN has much faster response time (about 16 times faster) as compared
to flooding and MOCA due to the fact that some partials are available at the
local cache of the requester. Besides, CACMAN requests never propagate
more than one hop.
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SECTION 6
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This section is the conclusion o f this dissertation. We will summarize the motivation for
our work, the problem we addressed, and our proposed solution to offering secure and
highly available CA service in MANET. We will then present a roadmap for enhancing
and extending our work in the future. The section is organized into two subsections:
Section 6.1 is the summary and conclusion o f this work, and Section 6.2 is an elaboration
about further extensions and enhancements.

6.1.

Summary and Conclusion

The introduction of MANET has reshaped our thinking about many problems that
researchers have faced in computer systems that caused them to seek genuine solutions
due to MANET's unique and distinctive characteristics such as dynamic topology
changes combined with power restrictions, transmission range, and limited computational
capabilities.
In this dissertation, we started by showing that security is a fundamental part of
MANET, yet it has not been seriously addressed until recently. Every aspect o f MANET
is inherently vulnerable to wider security attacks compared to wired networks. Frequency
jamming, routing protocol disruption, snooping, or straight physical compromising o f
nodes (e.g. [41], [57], [73], [28]) are just a few examples o f some security problems that
have a wide spectrum of possible solutions in MANET. Quality o f Service (QoS), too,
has been tackled in MANET from a variety o f perspectives (e.g. [13], [14], [27], [45]),
and guaranteeing availability o f vital services is yet another difficult MANET problem
that requires specialized solutions for this environment.
Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) is an important service that provides a framework
for a system using public-key primitives and operations to achieve security functions
such

as Authentication, Authorization,

Privacy, Integrity, and Non-repudiation.
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Certificates, as a major PKI component, are used for encrypting and/or signing many
vital applications, such as authentication, exchange o f routing info, encrypting or signing
emails, and much more. A Certificate Authority (CA), at the heart o f any PKI system, is
usually used to organize, store, and issue those certificates. Furthermore, adopting PKI in
MANET is not an easy task since providing a reliable and secure service is much more
challenging as compared to well-connected and reliable wired networks. We discussed
solutions proposed to adapt CA in MANET (Section 3), and most o f these solutions rely
on secret sharing mechanisms (Section 2.4) to increase security and availability. These
solutions assume installing the CA service in just one node will make it vulnerable, and
an exact replication o f the CA will make the situation even worse.
Kong et al. proposed Ubiquitous and Robust Security Architecture (URSA)
(Section 3.3) to provide pervasive CA services by making all (n ) nodes in the network
share CA functionality. The private-key of the service is shared by all nodes, but any t
member can form a coalition to sign certificates which are trusted by the whole network.
The problem of choosing a low threshold value to guarantee availability, in addition to
other technical issues, reduces its practicality.
We described Mobile CA (MOCA) (Section 3.5) protocol and showed that it has
been introduced as the counterpart of the Cornell Online Certificate Authority
(COCA)(Section 3.4) framework, but with consideration to MANET's unique properties.
MOCA is a mobile node in the MANET, and it is selected to provide distributed CA
functionality. When a client wants to obtain a certificate, it sends Certificate Request
(CREQ) packets to at least t (usually more) MOCA servers and waits for a reply. Any
MOCA that receives a CREQ will reply by sending a Certification Reply (CREP) packet
containing its partial signature. Once the client receives at least t valid CREPs, it can
reconstruct the whole certificate. CREQ and CREP have been embedded in Route
Request (RREQ) and Route Reply (RREP) messages that are found in on-demand ad-hoc
routing protocols like AODV [63] and DSR [16] to reduce the amount o f overhead
packets. MOCA increases availability by letting clients send more than t unicast CREQ
just in case. Additionally, to avoid flooding the network, MOCA clients inspect the route
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table to see if any cached routes to MOCAs are available, making flooding a last resort
when the cached routes are less than a given threshold.
We have two major concerns about MOCA which we believe may reduce the
usability o f the framework. The first concern is that the number o f MOCA nodes is
relatively high, about 10 to 20% o f the total number of participants. We believe that this
does not come without some consequences, such as CA synchronization and key
refreshing overhead. The second concern is that the number of control packets, the sum
of CREQ and CREP, generated by MOCA is high compared to Flooding. In the best case,
MOCA saves about 30% of packet overhead when t = 5 and only about 5% when t = 25.
We started our work, "CAching Certificates in Mobile Ad-hoc networks"
(CACMAN), by a preliminary evaluation using Monte Carlo simulation presented in [8]
but without any consideration of mobility. Then, we revised our work [9], [10] and used a
more realistic simulator i.e. NS-2 [47]. The aim o f our research in this dissertation is to
minimize the burden of adapting CA services in MANET by minimizing the packet
overhead and maintaining high availability o f the service at the same time. This has been
achieved by making clients share some responsibilities with CA servers by cooperatively
caching some certificates generated by CA servers. We showed how the characteristics of
certificates have made caching a reasonable solution to the availability problem. Our
cashing-based framework has addressed the security and performance challenges of
providing CA services in MANET. Moreover, we suggested techniques with minimal
overhead that help achieve our main goal, availability, without compromising MANET
security. We showed the feasibility of our framework and compared it to other related
systems using the NS-2 simulator which gave us more insight into the problem from the
performance perspective.
In CACMAN, each client that wants to obtain the certificate o f other client(s) to
establish a secure communication or to encrypt some messages will search its own cache
for a complete certificate of the subject. If found, then the request is completed;
otherwise, it will identify the missing partials and proceed by making a local broadcast,
but if it happens that it has a short route to the subject in question, it sends the CREQ to
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that subject instead of making a local broadcast. Every client that receives a CREQ
message inspects its cache for a possible hit. It sends a CREP back to the sender if a full
or partial certificate(s) is found for the subject. After that, the client waits for a specified
time; if it receives sufficient responses then it reconstructs the certificate. If the request
initiator times out because insufficient partials have been received or the reconstruction
has failed, then the client may try to contact CA servers by flooding the network or by
sending unicast messages if it has sufficient routes to them. Otherwise, it reports a failure
to the client or retries later.
In our simulations, we used the most recent build o f NS-2 to simulate the same
scenario used in MOCA to ensure fair comparisons. Each configuration was replicated at
least three times. For CACMAN protocol, we used four cache sizes - (75, 150, 225, and
300 share slots) - and four thresholds for key construction - (5, 15, 20, and 25). The
results show CACMAN can enhance the CA service, and we summarize our findings into
the following points:
1) The threshold had noticeable effect on performance. Higher thresholds,
though increasing system security, will make the likelihood o f getting all
partials from the first attempt lower. And to a great extent, CACMAN is able
to tolerate high threshold better than MOCA.
2) The number of replies received per request is still larger than required except
when t - 25, in which case the number o f successful replies is reduced
dramatically. However, when we applied the X-replies variation, the number
of successful CREPs increased noticeably.
3) Mobility does not have a significant effect on CACMAN performance due to
its utilization of local broadcasts to obtain service.
4) Cache size plays a major role in CACMAN. Increasing the size from 75
shares to 150 is significant and effective. However, going from 150 to 225 has
lesser impact, and this holds regardless of the threshold and/or maximum
speeds, which makes 150 ideal in terms of cache size and hit ratio tradeoffs
for the examined environment.
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5) CACMAN has a very significant reduction in packet overhead; for example,
MOCA saves about 30% over Flooding when threshold is set to 5, while
CACMAN saves 92% at the same threshold. Furthermore, the overhead is
also affected proportionally, in the case o f CACMAN, by the cache size and
the number of replies.
6) Various proposed enhancements have noticeable impact on CACMAN
performance. X-Replies, Lazy-Replies with Cancellation, and Cache-Focus
played a pivotal role in enhancing the framework availability.
7) CACMAN has faster response time (up to 16 times) than flooding and MOCA
due to its caching techniques; moreover, CACMAN requests never propagate
more than one hop.
8) The framework's ability to maintain high availability with much less network
overhead allows many other protocols that depend on public-key operations to
be introduced in MANET without the fear of increasing the overall overhead
caused by security.
We have investigated other topics associated with our framework such as the
impact of removing CA servers from CACMAN without significant loss in performance.
The impact of CA key refreshing on the framework and how to overcome the
consequences thereof have also been investigated. "Partial certificates compaction and
redundancy removal" and "cache replacement policies" have been conceptually discussed
to complement our framework. We also analyzed the impact o f applying different
revocation schemes. Enhancements to the basic protocol such as Cache-Focus and LazyReplies with Cancellation has proven to be useful to boost the framework further. Finally,
CACMAN deployment in hybrid environments has been discussed and shown to be
useful as well.
In conclusion, this dissertation has the following major contribution:
CACMAN is able to reduce network overhead associated with threshold
based CA service up to 92% as compared to related work with very short
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response time (about 16 times faster). The dependency on CA servers has
been reduced and CACMAN is able (in the simulation) to tolerate as much
as 20 inoperative CA servers out o f 30 (due to crash or offline operations)
without noticeable decrease in the performance. By separating availability
from security, which is an inherent problem o f threshold-based solutions
and in CACAMAN, we are able to alleviate that problem.

6.2.

Future Extensions

Here, we will present different possible directions that could be investigated for further
expansion of our work in this dissertation.
6.2.1

New Communication Paradigm and Applications

In this thesis, our focus and discussion was in the domain o f caching certificates and how
to speedup this operation with less overhead. If we take a closer look into the CACMAN
request operation, the sequence of a transaction will always follow a one-to-many-to-one
[22] communication paradigm. We call the first part o f the previous term (i.e. one-tomany) "Quorum-cast" since we are trying to reach a threshold of servers. Quorum-cast is
considered a generalization of multicasting, and more details can be found in [29], [24],
Carter et al. [22] have discussed some other applications, besides MOCA (Section 3.5),
for one-to-many-to-one, such as version 4 o f the Network Time Protocol (NTP) [50],
The introduction of a caching component, as we did in CACMAN, could bring
more

efficiency

into

one-to-many-to-one

types

of

applications

since

clients

collaboratively help the servers. However, not all application are cache compatible, for
example, consider NTP where it is makes no sense to cache servers' replies. Finding other
potential applications that could benefit from our introduction o f caching as part o f the
paradigm is one of our future goals.
6.2.2

Low-density Topologies

Section 5 is dedicated to examine the performance part o f CACMAN and compare it to
related work. However, we did not have much freedom to control many o f the simulation

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

90

parameters because a fair comparison is impossible unless we test both protocols under
identical conditions.
Thus, it is interesting to investigate on performance o f CACMAN into different
topologies and node sizes. The topology we used in studying CACMAN is a 1000m2
area. Although this size and the total number of nodes (i.e. 150) is common in MANET
simulations, we think it is relatively dense. We think that it is worth extending the
simulation to cover larger, hence lower-density areas with the same number of nodes
scenarios so that we can see how to tune CACMAN to keep its high performance. Our
preliminary investigations show that the performance o f CACMAN is expected to
improve if we allow a CREQ to propagate a little bit more than what is currently allowed
(e.g. TTL = 2 instead of local broadcast). Another technique worth trying is to use some
probabilistic forwarding scheme (i.e. the CREQ is forwarded to next hop with a given
probability) to find a balance point between maximum hit ratio and minimum overhead.
However, possibly other techniques like those discussed in Section 4.4 could lead to
different results.
6.2.3

Certificate Usage Distribution and Scalability

In this dissertation, we assumed that all certificates have similar popularity and are
distributed uniformly in client caches. This was also the case when a CACMAN client
makes a CREQ in which the probability o f requesting a certificate is uniformly
distributed. However, this could not be the case in practice because o f reference locality
(e.g. temporal or geographical). Although some empirical studies regarding the demand
of multimedia objects show that accessing patterns follow Zipf distribution [45], we
cannot say that is the case for certificates, and to the best o f our knowledge, such a study
is not available. Investigating certificate access and usage patterns in large scale
enterprises or on the Internet scale is an important topic to be studied. We think that
knowing how certificates are used and exchanged between principals will enable us to
make better plans for cache sizes and most likely will reduce the amount o f memory
required as compared to the uniform distribution that we have assumed in this
dissertation.
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Another benefit of finding a distribution model for certificate requests is
scalability since the cache size usually cannot cope with the dramatic increase of the
number of existing certificates and nodes. Currently, CACMAN memory requirements
increase linearly with the number of existing certificates, given that we have fixed all
other parameters. It is known that the lack of locality will adversely affect the scalability
of any application that utilizes caches to increase its performance.
6.2.4

Analytical Model

Another interesting issue is building an analytical model that captures the most important
parameters involved in the framework. Such a model will enable us to find optimum
values among conflicting parameters to satisfy the application requirements. In
CACMAN, we think building a generic topology-independent analytical model is worth
being investigated. For example, a model that takes parameters such as cache size, total
number of objects (i.e. certificates), threshold, objects distribution, and the number of
accessible neighbors into consideration to find, say, the hit ratio.
6.2.5

Miscellaneous Issues

Here, we briefly list other noteworthy issues. Some are considered easy from the
implementation point of view, but the problem o f finding the right assumptions may be
not that simple.
1) Cross-Layered10 Secure Framework: It is interesting to investigate how to
integrate CACMAN in a framework that addresses all identified security
threats in MANET and provide a single practical solution for them. Such
framework is security-centric, where security features and sub-protocols exist
in every layer of MANET stack. We urge researchers to study the possibility
and problems which may arise by such integration.

20 M. Conti et al. brought the issue o f the importance o f cross-layering in MANET, and in their model,
security indeed is a vertical element o f the MANET stack [23].
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2) Integration o f Detection System'. As a component of the previous point,
misbehaving nodes can decrease the usability o f CACMAN by injecting bad
partials. Using verification techniques, honest CACMAN clients can discover
such partials, and they may report the abuse incidents to CA servers, and if the
CA collects many complains about the same client, it may revoke the
certificate of the malicious node and broadcast such a decision. It is
interesting to investigate the details o f this protocol.
3) Generalization o f the Underlying Network Infrastructure: CACMAN has been
designed with MANET in mind. However, it is possible to extend it to other
environments such as Internet level peer-to-peer overlay networks which is a
good candid environment, though the parameters will be adapted accordingly.
4) CRL Performance: It is important to evaluate the performance impact o f
various CRL schemes when applied into MANET environments to see how
long it takes to disseminate CRL information to the entire network.
5) Practical Key Refreshing Time fo r CA Servers: Key refreshing has inherent
tradeoff between communication overhead, i.e. at least 0 ( n 2), and the
vulnerability created by allowing the intruder more time to compromise the
system if the window of vulnerability is too long. Knowing the impact of
choosing different key refreshing intervals on CACMAN performance is
important since it will affect the freshness o f cached results, as we discussed it
in Section 4.7.1.
6) The Efficiency o f Exchanging Caches Contents Procedure: This point could
be tackled based on the findings obtained from the previous point. Keyrefreshing frequently will allow many incompatible shares issued in different
epochs to exist in CACMAN clients' caches, which means additional
overhead. Using the protocol described in Section 4.7.2 would alleviate the
situation, and it will be interesting to get a quantitative result for the procedure
performance.
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APPENDIX A
NS-2 SIMULATOR

A.I Network Simulator (NS-2)
"NS is a discrete event simulator targeted at networking research. NS provides substantial
support for simulation of TCP, routing, and multicast protocols over wired and wireless
(local and satellite) networks. NS began as a variant of the REAL21 network simulator in
1989 and has evolved substantially over the past few years. In 1995 NS development was
supported by DARPA through the VINT22 project at LBL, Xerox PARC, UCB, and
USC/ISI. Currently NS development is support through DARPA with SAMAN and
through NSF with CONSER, both in collaboration with other researchers including
ACIRI. NS has always included substantial contributions from other researchers,
including wireless code from the UCB Daedelus and CMU Monarch projects and Sun
Microsystems" [47].
NS-2 has been implemented using OTCL [68] and C++ programming languages.
OTCL is an object-oriented variant o f TCL (Tool Command Language) and it is designed
for writing scripts and configurations files rapidly and without any necessary compilation
but with the shortcoming of execution speed since it is an interpreted language. C++ is
used for writing NS-2 core, protocols, and any code that does not change frequently. Both
languages are linked using some API that allows both languages to see each other
variables and objects at run time.

21 See http://www.cs.comell.edu/skeshav/real/overview.html.
22 See http://www.isi.edu/nsnam/vint/index.html.
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A.II Technology and Environment Used in CACMAN Implementation
We were able to build NS-2 version 2.27 successfully (after some effort) at the ODU
Computer Science Department on two Sun Fire™ V880 (each equipped with 8
UltraSPARC processors, 32GB RAM, and Solaris™ 9 OS). We have followed an Object
Oriented Design approach to develop the framework using C++ and benefited from its
Standard Template Library (STL) though it was not recommend to be used in NS for
portability reasons. GCC 3.3.2 was used to compile about 2000 lines o f source code for
the simulation and configuration. Perl 5.8.0 was used to analyze and aggregate 67 GB of
trace file generated by our simulation. MS-Office™ 2003 suite used to plot figures, draw
diagrams, and typesetting the dissertation.
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APPENDIX B
TECHNICAL OVERVIEW OF CACMAN
This appendix contains snapshots from CACMAN design and implementation. Static
diagram is shown in Appendix B.I. Appendix B.II contains packet types and formats for
some CACMAN messages. Appendix B.III is the OTCL scripts for configuring and
running the simulation. Finally, Appendix B.IV contains C++ code o f a one o f the
CACMETN core methods.

B.I Class Diagram
Fig. 22 is Unified Modeling Language (UML) static23 representation of CACMAN
design and it summaries some important facts about the work. We have implemented
other protocols as a proof of concept prototypes. Class "Agent" is the root that all other
protocol will derive from and it contains some virtual methods that may be overridden by
each protocol. In our simulation the CA servers are just MOCA servers and they do not
playing in additional rule besides sending CREPs whenever they receiver any requests.
CACMAN client has an important member, i.e. "sharesCache", of type "CertCache"
which is responsible for managing partials.

23 The Dynamic Model o f the system is partially shown in Section 4.3
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Agent
+threshold : int
#servers
sim mode
+command(in args : *ch a r): int
+CREQ(in c e rt: in t) : void
+recv(in p a cke t): int

-------------------ZS----------

-has a

CACMAN

MOCA

COCA

■sharesCache: CertCache
■certCache_ : map
■routes_cache : vector
■reqs: set

4

-d e le g a te : int

+rebuildeCache()
+dumpRoutCache()

MOCA client

MOCA server

■CA route cache : vector
■reqs : set

CertCache
-threshold : int
-maxsize : int
-totalnodes: int
-currentsize : int
-myfocus : int
-CF : int
-num _of_servers: int
-father_cache : map
+addShare(in c e rtjd : int, in s h a re jd : in t) : void
+rem oveShare(): bool
+getS ize(): int
+find(in c e rtjd : int, in s h a re jd : int)
+ isF u ll(): bool
+fillC ache(): void
+fillCacheColored(in CF : in t) : void
+findAII(in c e r tjd : in t) : set
+dump()

Fig. 22. Static structure o f important CACMAN modules

We also summarize important methods and properties in Table IX for a better
understanding of Fig. 22.
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T a b l e IX
M e th o d s a n d P r o p e r t ie s su m m ery

M ethod or property
Agent: Threshold
Agent:: servers
Agent: :sim mode
Agent:: Command

Agent:: CREQ

1Agent: :recv

CACMAN::sharesCache

CACMAN: :certCache
1CertCache: Threshold
CertCache: :maxsize
CertCache: xurrentsize
CertCache: :myfocus
CertCache: :CF
CertCache::fathercache
CertCache: mum of servers
CertCache: :addShare
CertCache: :removeShare

CertCache:: find
CertCache ::isFull
CertCache:: fillCache

CertCache::fillCacheColored
CertCache: :fmdAll
CertCache: :dump

Purpose
Security threshold o f the system.
Holds the addresses o f CA servers.
Node type (e.g. CACMAN, MOCA, ...etc).
Receives commands passed from OTCL in string format.
The method should be overridden and each protocol has
its own set of commands.
Certificate Request expects principal ID as a parameter.
The method should be handled by each protocol
according to its technique o f sending CREQs
Packets received by the agent, usually CREQ, are passed
to this method. The packet contains the protocol header
besides IP header.
This object is the cache manager o f CACMAN agent and
more details about its contract is shown under CertCache
below.
A hash table for outstanding requests
The cache manager needs to now the threshold since this
information is important for share combining.
Maximum size for the cache measured by number o f
shares.
Contains the current number o f cached shares.
A set that contains ID numbers o f CAs which this client
will focus on (used in Cache-Focus enhancement only)
The size of the cache focus group.
It is the superset that contains all possible shares. Its
replications are used for initializing new caches.
Used by "father cache"
Adds a share to CACMAN client cache.
Remove a share from CACMAN client cache. The
manger will the algorithm specified in Section 4.7.4 for
choosing the victim.
Search for a specific certificate.
Returns true if the certificate cache is full.
Initializes the cache randomly with partials based on
some constraints (e.g. number o f servers, size, and CF
usage)
Called by "fillCache" when cache-focus is in use.
Returns a set that contains the shares o f the specified
certificates.
Print cache contents for debug purpose.
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B.II CACMAN Packet Format

unused:

RT

R equest TS

Cert ID
S hare ID

Certificate Contents

UDP header
IP header

Fig. 23. CACMAN's packet format. RT stands for request type (CREQ=0, CREP=1, RCancel=2). Request
TS is to hold the timestamp when the CREQ is issued and used for setting various timers and statistics. Cert
ID is used to identify the CREQ and to tell what certificate is inside the payload if used in CREP messages.
Share ID is to tell which share is in the CREP payload. Certificate Contents holds certificate data. The
implementation uses a slight modified design o f this format.

B.III An Example of a Simulation Scenario
Fig. 24 shows CACMAN main script used for running NS-2 simulation.
# cacman.tcl

#

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

# Laith Al-Sulaiman (lal-sula@cs.odu.edu)
# Old Dominion University, Computer Science Department
# 2005

#

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

# Define options and simulaiton environments
set
set
set
set
set
set
set

val(chan)
val(prop)
val(netif)
val(mac)
val(ifq)
v a l (11)
val(ant)

Channel/WirelessChannel
Propagation/TwoRayGround
Phy/WirelessPhy
Mac/802_11
Queue/DropTail/PriQueue
LL
Antenna/OmniAntenna

Fig. 24. CACMAN main script written in OTCL.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

105

set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set
#

# X dimension of the topography
1000
1000
# Y dimension of the topography
50
# max packet in ifq
0.0
AODV
# default number of nodes
20
# default threshold
5
"sc ens/ m o c a - s e n .tel" ;
"scens/scen-lOOOxlOO0-20-0-10-1" ;
•# simulation time
600
ON

val(x)
val(y)
val(ifqlen)
val(seed)
val(adhocRouting)
val(nn)
val(thresh)
val(cp)
val(sc)
val(stop)
val(logAgent)

= = = = = = = = = = = = =

# Main Program
#

# new seed and all streams will be de rived from that seed
global defaultRNG
$defaultRNG seed 10877

# parse the command line
for {set i 0} {$i < $argc
set [lindex $argv $i]
set i [expr $i + 2]

} { } {
[lindex $argv

[expr $ i + l ] ]

}

# read the total number of nodes,
if { [info exists n ] } {
set val(nn) $n

threshold,

and scenario file

}
if {[info exists t ] } {
set val(thresh) $t
}

if {[info exists sc]}
set val(sc) $sc

{

}
# set number of servers
if { $val(nn) >= 150 } {
set val(servers) 30
} else {
set val(servers) $val(thresh)
}

# in case of we have 300 nodes make val (servers)
if { $val(nn) >= 300 } {
set val(servers) 50

= 50

}________________________________________________________________________
Fig. 24. Continued.
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puts "servers = $val(servers)\nthreshold = $val(thresh)\nnn =
$val(nn)\nfile = $val(sc)"

# Initialize Global Variables
#
# define simulation mode (CACMAN,

MOCA,

COCA,

KONG)

and threshold

set simulation_mode "CACMAN"
set threshold $val(thresh)
# create simulator instance
set n s _

[new Simulator]

# setup topography object
set topo

[new Topography]

# prepare the trace file which is derived from the command line params
set tracefd [open "$val(sc)- ( $simulation_mode-$val(thresh)).tr" w]
$ns_ use-newtrace
$ns_ trace-all $tracefd
# define topology
$topo load_flatgrid $val(x)

$val(y)

# Create God
set god_ [create-god $val(nn)]
#
# define how node should be created
#
# this proc is to attach nodes to the trace descriptor
proc addTracer { agt } {
global ns_
global tracefd
global val
if { $val(logAgent) == "ON" } {
set T [new Trace/Generic]
$T target [$ns_ set nullAgent_]
$T attach $tracefd
$T set src_ 1
$agt log-target $T

}
return 1
}

#global node setting

Fig. 24. Continued.
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$ns_ node-config -adhocRouting $val(adhocRouting) \
- H T y p e $val(ll) \
-macType $val(mac) \
-ifqType $val(ifq) \
-ifqLen $val(ifqlen) \
-antType $val(ant) \
-propType $val(prop) \
-phyType $val(netif) \
-channelType $val(chan) \
-topolnstance $topo \
-agentTrace $val(logAgent)
\
-routerTrace ON\
-macTrace OFF \
-movementTrace OFF

#

#
#

Create the specified number of nodes
to the channel.

for {set i 0} {$i < $val(nn) } {incr i}
set node_($i) [$ns_ node]
$node_($i) random-motion 0

[$val(nn)] and "attach" them

{
;# disable random motion

}
#
# Define traffic model
#
puts "Loading connection pattern from $val(cp)
source $val(cp)

..."

# Define node movement model
#

puts "Loading scenario file from $val(sc) ..."
# the content of that source is shown in the next figure
source $val(sc)
#

# Tell all nodes when the simulation ends
#

for {set i 0} {$i < $val(nn) } {incr i} {
$ns_ at $ v a l ( s t o p ) .002 "$node_($i) reset";

}
$ns_ at
halt"
puts
puts

$ v a l (s t o p ) .02 "puts \"NS EXITING...\"

"nn $val(nn) x $val(x) y $val(y)
"prop $val(prop) ant $val(ant)"

; close

$tracefd;

rp $v a l ( a d h o c R o u t i n g ) "

Fig. 24. Continued.
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# run the simulaiton
puts "Starting Simulation.
$ns
run

M

Fig. 24. Continued.

The script that controls requests and agents creation is shown below.
# create CA servers
for {set i 0} {$i < $val(servers) } {incr i} {
set moca_($i) [new Agent/Cacman "S"]
$ns_ attach-agent $node_([expr $val(nn) - $i - 1])
# let the clients print
addTracer $moca_($i)
# it may need i t !
#$moca_($i) cacman2dsr
$moca ($i) cacman2aodv

$moca_($i)

# special case for COCA
if { $simulation_mode == "COCA" } {
puts "COCA mode adding servers to cocas";
# in COCA case also add them each athor
for {set i 0} {$i < $val(servers) } {incr i} {
for {set j 0} {$j < Sval(server s)} {incr j} {
$moca_($i) AddMocas $moca_($j)

}
}
}

# new radnom generator requests
set r [new RNG]
# create clients
for {set i 0} {$i < [expr $val(nn) - $ v a l(se rvers) ] } {incr i} {
# the extra param after C is used by cacman only
set cac_($i) [new Agent/Cacman "C" ]
if { $simulation_mode == "CACMAN" } {
# specify cache size and type
#$cac_($i) createcache [expr int($val(nn)* 0.30 * $val( thresh)) ]
$cac_($i) createcache [expr i n t ($val(nn)* 0.50 ) ]
#$cac_($i) createcacheColored [expr int( $val(n n)* 1.00 ) ] "8" ;

}
$ns_ attach-agent $node_($i) $cac_($i)
$cac_($i) cacman2aodv
# this is also correct $node_($i) attach $cac_($i)
for {set j 0} {$j < $ val(servers)} {incr j} {
$cac_($i) AddMocas $moca_($j)

}_______________________________________________________________________________
Fig. 25. Scenario configuration script.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

109

# let the clients print
addTracer $cac_($i)
}

# how many requests will be sent
if { $val (nn) >= 300 } {
set totalreqs 200
} elseif { $val(nn) == 150 } {
set totalreqs 100
} else {
puts "Warning you are using not standard value\nall clients will
send 10 rquests"
set totalreqs [expr $val(nn) - $ v a l(s ervers )]
}

# schedule 1000 reqeusts (i.e. 10 CREQ/client)
for {set i 0} {$i < $totalreqs } {incr i} {
for {set j 0} {$j < 10} {incr j} {
$ns_ at [$r uniform 0 $val(stop)] "$cac_($i)

CREQ"

}

_ J _____________________________________________________________________________________
Fig. 25. Continued.

B.IV CACMAN Certificate Reply (CREP) Implementation
void Ca c m a n C l i e n t A g e n t ::recv (Packet *pkt, Handler *) {
// Access the IP header for the received packet:
hdr_ip *hdrip = h d r _ i p ::access (pkt);
// Access the Cacman header for the received packet:
hdr_cacman *hdr = h d r _ c a c m a n ::access (pkt);
// cacman should not inspect a packet the does not belong to it
int s = hdrip->src_.addr_ » A d d r e s s ::i n s t a n c e ().N o d e S h i f t _ [1];
int d = hdrip->dst_.addr_ >> A d d r e s s ::i n s t a n c e ().N o d e S h i f t _ [1];
double now = S c h e d u l e r ::i n s t a n c e ().c l o c k ();
double rtt = (now - hdr->send_time) * 1000;
//jitter delay
const double response_delay = .640;
//RNG rdelay;
if

(s == this->here_.addr_) {
// Discard the packet its a loop
cerr << sim_mode_Str << "("<< t h i s - > h e r e _ .a d d r _ « " ) "<<"a
loo p\n";
} else if (d == this->here_.addr_ && hdr->ret == 1){
// This packet is addressed to me and it has a respose for m y request
/ / s o add it to the cache manager
shareCache->addShare(hdr->cert_id , h d r - >s hare_ id);
if(shareCache->find(hdr->cert_id,COMPLETE_CERT) || hdr>share_id == COMPLETE_CERT) {

Fig. 26. CACMAN X-Rep CREP implementation.
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//fill it as we got 't' shares
for (int i =0 ; i < threshold ; i++)
certCa che_[h dr->se nd_tim e].i nser t ( i ) ;
};
if(hdr->share_id != C O M P L E T E _ C E R T ) {
//this to show how many replies has been acctually collected
certCac he_[hd r->se nd_tim e].inse rt(hdr ->share_id);

};
//prepare output to trace file
ost << sim_mode_Str <<"
« n o w « " N o d e ("<<this>here . a d d r _ « " ) from ("<<s<<") to ("<<d<<") CREP for request# ("<<hdr>s e nd _time <<") c e r t ("<<hdr->cert_id <<") r t t ("<<rtt<<")
( " « c e r t C a c h e _ [hdr->send_time] .size () <<" out of "<<threshold<<") " ;
o s t . p u t (0) ;
trace ("%s ",o s t .str () .c_str ());
o s t .str ("");
} else if (d == this->here_.addr_ && hdr->ret == 0){
//I've been asked directly
set<int> pool = shareCache->findAl l(hdr ->cert _i d);
//send all my records about this cert
if (!p o o l . e m p t y ()) {
//send only one
int foo = 0;
for (set<int>::iterator it = pool.begin() ; it !=
p o o l . e n d O && foo < 1; ++it, foo++) {
if (verbose && 1) cerr << s i m _ m o d e _ S t r « "
Node (" < < t h i s - > h e r e _ . a d d r _ « " ) cache hit for c ( " « h d r >cert_id<<","<<*it<<")\n" ;
ost<<sim_mode_Str<<" Node("<<this>here_.addr _<<") from ("<< s « " ) to ( " « d «
") CREP for request# (" «
hdr->send_time << ") send cert(" « h d r - > c e r t _ i d « " , " < < * i t « " ) " ;
o s t .p u t (0) ;
trace ("%s",ost.str() .c _ s t r ()) ;
o s t .s t r ("");
// Create a new packet
Packet *spkt = allocpkt ();
// Access the Cacman header for the new packet:
hdr_cacman *shdr = h d r _ c a c m a n ::access (spkt);
//set response
shdr->ret = 1;
// Store the current time in the 'send_time' field
shdr->send_time = hdr->send_time;
// put the cert rep we have
shdr->cert_id = hdr->cert_id;//cert;
shdr->share_id = *it;
hdr_ip *hdrretrip = h d r _ i p ::access (spkt);
hdrretrip->dst_.addr_ = s;
hdr retrip->src_.addr_ = this->here_.addr_;
h d r r e t r i p - > d p o r t () = hdrretrip->sport ();
// Send the packet
send (spkt, 0);
// experimental comment send above if used
/ / S c h e d u l e r ::i n s t a n c e ().schedule(target_, spkt,
response_delay * r d e l a y .u n i f o r m (1.0));

Fig. 26. Continued.
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}

}
} else if (d >= ALLJSERVERS || d == IP _BROADCAST){
//this is a flood or all servers request check if I can help
if (reqs.find(hdr->send_time) == r e q s . e n d O && r n g . u n i f o r m ( l .0)
> 0.0) {
//handle duplicate requests, this request has not seend before
//remember it
r e q s .in sert(hdr->send_time);
set<int> pool = shareCache->findA ll(hdr ->cer t_i d);
int share = -2; //any neg number except -1 is fine
//How many reps (51) means X-Rep-All
for (int i=0;i<51;i++) {
if (!p o o l .e m p t y ()) {
if (pool.find (-1) != p o o l . e n d O ) {
share = COMPLET E_CERT ;
} else {
int random_pos = r n g .u n i f o r m ( (int)p o o l .s i z e ());
//bad way to do it! but this seems the only way
s e t < i n t > ::iterator it = p o o l . b e g i n ();
for (int i=0 ;i < random_pos; i++)
it++;
share = *it;
p o o l .erase(share) ;

}
o s t « s i m _ m o d e _ S t r < < " Node ( " « t h i s >here_.addr_<<") from ( " « s « " ) to ("<< d << ") CREP for request# (" <<
hdr->send_time «
") send cert(" « h d r - > c e r t _ i d « " , " « s h a r e « " ) ";
ost.put (0);
trace ("%s " ,o s t .s t r ().c _ s t r ());
o s t .str ("");
// Create a new packet
Packet *spkt = allocpkt ();
// Access the Cacman header for the new packet:
hdr_cacman *shdr = h d r _ c a c m a n ::access (spkt);
//set response
shdr->ret = 1;
// Store the current time in the 's e n d _ t i m e ' field
shdr->send_time = hdr->send_time;
// put the cert we have
shdr->cert_id = hdr->cert_id;//cert;
shdr->share_id = share;
hdr_ip *hdrretrip = h d r _ i p ::access (spkt);
h d r r e t r i p - > d s t _ .addr_ = s;
h d r r e t r i p - > s r c _ .addr_ = t h i s - > h e r e _ .addr_;
h d r r e t r i p - > d p o r t () = hdrretri p->sp ort ();
// Send the packet
send (spkt, 0);
//experemental
/ / S c h e d u l e r ::i n s t a n c e ().schedule(target_, spkt,
response_delay * r d e l a y .u n i f o r m (1.0));

}______________________________________________________________
Fig. 26. Continued.
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if

//we need to send the complete cert once!
(share == COMPLETE_CERT) break;

}
}
} else

{
// to be completed
//if (verbose)
cerr << sim_mode_Str « this->here__.addr_ <<" This packet is not
a ddr essed to me but I'm having it s="<<s<<" d="<<d<<"\n" ;

};
//at last! done from the packet
Packet::free (pkt);

Fig. 26. Continued.
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APPENDIX C
ACRONYMS
Table X
I m p o r t a n t a c r o n y m s u s e d in t h e t h e s is a n d t h e i r m e a n in g s

| Acronym
AO
AODV
CA
COCA
CREP
CREQ
CRL
DSR
FOR
MANET
MOCA
NS
PGP
PKI
POSR
PSS
URSA
RSA

M eaning
Adjusted Overhead
Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing
Certificate Authority
Cornell Certificate Authority
Certificate Reply
Certificate Request
Certificate Revocation List
Dynamic Source Routing
Flooding overhead per request
Mobile Ad hoc Network
Mobile Certificate Authority
Network Simulator
Pretty Good Privacy
Public-Key Infrastructure
Packet overhead per successful request
Proactive Secret Sharing
Ubiquitous and Robust Access Control for Mobile Ad
Hoc Networks
Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman
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